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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Leapley, Jennifer, M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2012. 
“The Effects of Chinese Petroleum Diplomacy on US Energy Policy Objectives in 
Nigeria (1993 – 2010).” 
 
 
 
The United States and China have turned to Africa as an additional source of oil 
to ensure reliable, secure access to oil supplies in the future. While China stresses 
noninterventionist foreign policies, the US, at least rhetorically, if not in practice, links its 
energy policy in Africa to its foreign policy goals. China’s petroleum diplomacy in Africa 
has raised concern among some scholars and policymakers about the effect an increased 
Chinese economic presence will have on American foreign policy objectives. 
 The question arises: What impact has Chinese petroleum diplomacy had on US 
foreign policy objectives? More specifically, how strongly, if at all, does an increased 
Chinese economic presence correlate with less democratic African governments, 
worsening of African countries’ human rights records, and less transparency among 
African governments? This paper will examine these questions using a longitudinal study 
of 1993 to 2010 in one case study, Nigeria. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
With energy consumption rising each year in developing countries like China and 
India, developed countries such as the United States find themselves increasingly 
competing for precious oil resources. Developing countries looking to secure access to 
and increase market share of oil supplies may not have similar energy policies to the 
United States. For example, the United States has stated that it seeks to utilize its energy 
policies as leverage to improve human rights records and promote democracy in African 
countries. China’s energy policy is kept (at least rhetorically) separate from its foreign 
policy objectives. Many US policymakers have begun to speculate about what impact, if 
any, the increased Chinese economic presence in Africa will have on not just the level of 
African oil exports to the United States, but also on US foreign policy objectives on the 
continent. 
Trends in Global Oil Consumption  
2009 data demonstrate that the United States is the world’s largest consumer of 
oil using 18.8 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d). China is the second largest consumer. 
However, China uses only 8.5 million bbl/d. The third largest consumer is Japan (4.4 
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million bbl/d), fourth is India (3 million bbl/d), and fifth is Russia (2.9 million bbl/d) 
(“Country Energy Profiles”). China and India have the fastest oil consumption growth 
rates with China’s being two and half times the rate of India (Goldstein et. al 26 - 27). 
The U.S. Department of Energy’s 2009 International Energy Outlook (IEO) predicts that, 
if current trends continue, China and the United States will remain the two largest 
consumers of overall energy and oil through 2030 (“International Energy Outlook” 10). 
The IEO’s data show that in 2030 the United States will consume 21.7 million bbl/d and 
China will consume 15.3 million bbl/d.  Already the United States and China are vying 
for access to many of the same oil supplies. Henry Lee estimates that by 2020 nearly 80% 
of Middle Eastern oil will go to Asia (Lee 56 – 88). Lee argues that this trend, along with 
the lack of investment by oil producing countries in discovering new oil supplies to meet 
growing demand, will result in competition among states for access to secure, reliable, 
and affordable oil. Global oil consumption has risen steadily over the last thirty years. 
Since 1990 global oil consumption has increased over 28% from 66.68 million bbl/d to 
85.5 million bbl/d in 2008 (“International Petroleum Consumption”). The rate of 
consumption increase is not steady over time (see Figure 1). From 1980 to 1990 the rate 
of global oil consumption only increased 4.7% (“International Petroleum Consumption”). 
However, from 1990 – 2000 global consumption rates rose 15%. Additionally, from 2000 
– 2009 oil consumption rates increased 9.45% (“International Petroleum Consumption”). 
The IEO finds that the global economic recession which began in 2008 will likely 
decrease global oil consumption rates for a few years, but the IEO predicts that global 
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consumption will rise in the long term. In 2015, the IEO predicts that global oil 
consumption will be 93 million bbl/d, an increase from 86 million bbl/d in 2008 
(“International Energy Statistics” 25). 
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Figure 1. Growth in Total World Petroleum Consumption
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The recent rise in demand is not the result of declining oil prices. In recent years, 
the price of crude oil rose. In fact, world crude oil prices peaked in July 2008 at 137.11 
US dollars per barrel (“World Crude Oil Prices”). After dropping significantly from 
January 2009 to early May 2009, global crude oil prices are rising on a fairly consistent 
basis. Economic growth in oil importing countries, such as India and China, and gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth in the United States and China are likely the most 
significant factors causing increased oil demand and consumption (Pirog 8). The IEO 
                                                 
1
 Data derived from Energy Information Administration. “International Petroleum (Oil) 
Consumption.” Web. 7 Dec. 2009. 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilconsumption.html>.   
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predicts that total world oil consumption will increase at an average of 1% annually 
between 2008 and 2035 (“International Energy Outook” 10).  
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 Figure 2. World Crude Oil Prices from July 2008 through December 2010
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Trends in US Oil Consumption  
 According to Sophie Méritet and Fabienne Salaiin, in 2006 oil composed 39% of 
US energy supply and represents 25% of global demand for energy (175). They argue the 
United States must rely on imported oil to meet the demand of its “oil addiction.” This oil 
addiction is growing so quickly that Méritet and Salaiin project that imported oil could 
make up as much as 75% of total oil consumed in the United States by 2020 (178). US 
levels of oil consumption have grown drastically since 1990 from 16.98 million bbl/d to 
19.47 million bbl/d in 2008, or over 14%. Since 1993, the amount of oil the United States 
imported from OPEC countries has ranged from 45-55% of total imports annually. 
However, the amount of oil imported from the Persian Gulf has fallen from a high of 2.92 
                                                 
2
 Data derived from Energy Information Administration. “World Crude Oil Prices.” Web. 14 Dec. 2009. 
<http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WTOTWORLD&f=W>. 
5 
 
million bbl/d in 2004 to 1.7 million bbl/d as of September 2009 (“U.S. Net Imports by 
Country”). To meet growing demands the United States has looked to diversify its 
sources of imported petroleum. In 2011, the United States imported oil from several 
African countries, including Angola, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Chad, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, and Ivory Coast (“U.S. Imports by Country of Origin”). With the 
exception of Gabon, oil imports from each of these countries have increased in the last 
ten years. In fact, oil importation from some countries has only started in the last ten 
years. In October of 1999, the United States imported no oil from Libya, Chad, 
Equatorial Guinea, or Ivory Coast (“U.S. Net Imports by Country”). 
US Oil Imports: January 1993 - January 2009
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Figure 3. US Oil Imports between January 1993 and January 2009
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Trends in Chinese Oil Consumption 
 As China continues to grow demographically and economically and develop new 
industries and expand existing manufacturing industries, oil is providing a key and vital 
energy source needed for sustainable growth rates. Stephanie Hanson notes that China’s 
                                                 
3
 Data derived from Energy Information Administration. “U.S. Net Imports by Country.” Web. 14 Dec. 
2009. <http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_neti_a_ep00_IMN_mbblpd_m.htm>. 
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annual 9% growth rate for the past twenty years led it to become a net oil importer 
starting in 1993. This data is confirmed by the EIA which notes that Chinese oil 
consumption began to exceed oil production in 1993 (“China: Oil”). According to the 
OECD, China’s net oil imports increased 23% since 2000, from 80.57 million tons 
annually in 2000 to 99.15 million tons annually in 2003 (Goldstein et. al 26). Looking 
back to 1993, China’s imports have increased 6775% from a mere 56,000 bbl/d to over 
3.85 million bbl/d in 2008 (“China Energy Profile”). Further, China’s increased oil 
imports accounted for 9.2% of total global oil import growth from 2000-2004 (Goldstein 
et. al 28). In 2008, half of China’s oil imports came from the Middle East, with 30% of 
oil imports coming from Africa, 3% from the Asia-Pacific region, and the remaining 7% 
from various other countries (“China: Oil”).  
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Figure 4. Chinese Crude Oil Imports by Source, 2009 (Thousand barrels per day)
4
 
                                                 
4
 Chart data obtained from Energy Information Administration.. 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Oil.html>. 
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Figure 5. Chinese Oil Consumption and Production
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The Research Question 
How strongly, if at all, has Chinese petroleum diplomacy in oil-exporting African 
countries affected the level of African oil exports to the United States and the stated 
foreign policy goals of the United States? More specifically, does an increased Chinese 
economic presence correlate to worsening Freedom House political rights scores and 
worsening Freedom House civil liberties scores? 
6
  
 
 
                                                 
5
 Chart obtained from U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Oil.html>. 
6
 The impact of the United States’ economic involvement on US foreign policy objectives will not be 
examined in this paper for two reasons. First, it is more parsimonious to examine the effects of one actor’s 
(China’s) economic involvement on another actor’s foreign policy objectives. Second, due to time and 
space constraints, focusing solely on the impact of Chinese economic involvement will permit the 
necessary in-depth analysis of possible intervening variables which is required to contextualize the 
statistical data. 
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Sub-questions 
1) Are American and Chinese energy policies in Nigeria different in rhetoric 
and in practice in terms of securing access to adequate, reliable supplies of oil and 
achieving stated policy goals? 
The above research questions will be examined in one case: Nigeria. This study 
chose Nigeria because both the United States and China are actively involved in 
Nigeria’s oil industry. Additionally, Nigeria has been a major oil producing and oil 
exporting state since the 1960’s, when Nigeria granted multiple international oil 
companies exploration rights. Nigeria’s history of over 50 years as an oil producer and 
exporter provides ample opportunity to examine Nigerian oil policies, American oil 
policies, and Chinese oil policies within the same case study. Moreover, since the United 
States’ consistently remained a major purchaser of Nigerian oil for the time period 
covered in this study, while China did not, a case study of Nigeria is conducive to 
examining the impact of Chinese petroleum diplomacy on US foreign policy objectives. 
Methodology 
For the purpose of this study, I assume that Chinese and US energy policies and 
foreign policies in Nigeria differ from each other in practice as well as in rhetoric. All 
United States administrations for the years covered in this study (1993 – 2010) claim to 
use energy policies as leverage to encourage good governance, improve human rights, 
increase transparency, and obtain access to secure, affordable, and stable energy supplies 
in Nigeria. Conversely, China affirms that it seeks to use its energy policies solely to 
secure access to affordable and reliable oil sources which will support its growing 
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economy and industrial sector. China has strongly emphasized that it will not intervene in 
domestic Nigerian affairs as part of its energy policies. I hypothesize that an increased 
Chinese economic presence is negatively correlated with higher Freedom House political 
rights and civil liberties ratings. 
The case study method is appropriate for this research because it permits an in-
depth study of Nigeria which allows for utilization of process-tracing to explore possible 
intervening variables which may affect any correlation between independent and 
dependent variables. This is an especially valuable addition to a non-explanative 
statistical analysis, such as the one being employed in this study. Case studies, such as 
those in this study, are appropriate venues for process tracing interacting variables which 
are not independent of each other (George and Bennett 212). The independent variable 
will be the extent of Chinese economic involvement with Nigeria. The dependent 
variables in this case will be the Nigeria’s level of democracy, political transparency, and 
promotion of human rights.  
Since 1993, successive US administrations have stated that US foreign policy 
objectives in Africa include promoting democratic government institutions, protecting 
human rights, increased political transparency, and securing reliable, cheap access to oil 
(“China in Africa: Implications” 8). These goals can be measured using widely accepted 
rating systems. The Freedom House Country Reports indicate each country’s protection 
of human rights by measuring the trends regarding political and civil rights. This data 
will be analyzed in relation to changes in the levels of Chinese economic involvement in 
Nigeria. Chinese economic involvement will be measured by three variables: the 
percentage of each case’s overall exports to China, the percentage of each case’s total oil 
10 
 
exports to China, and the US dollar amount of oil each case exports from China. This 
data will be obtained from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Statistical Database. While other databases and organizations, such as the World Bank 
and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, contain data regarding 
each case’s overall trade with China, none of these sources provide a breakdown of trade 
by commodity to recipient country, which is required for this study. While the economic 
activity and the involvement of private oil corporations would be an interesting and 
useful factor in examining changes in Nigeria’s Freedom House scores, such data will be 
excluded from this study because it exceeds the scope of this study and private 
corporations are not necessarily bound by government policy (Chevalier 36). Traditional 
secondary sources, such as journal articles, news articles, books, reports of 
nongovernmental and intergovernmental agencies, and academic reports will be used to 
examine possible intervening variables or conditioning variables. This study will cover 
the time period from 1993 to 2010. 1993 was chosen because it is the year in which 
China first became a net importer of oil. The study ends in 2010, as 2011 data regarding 
trade, oil imports/exports, and Freedom House scores was not available at the time of this 
writing.
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II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Rise of Energy Politics 
 Energy politics can be a difficult term to define. It may refer to the policies of 
international oil companies, government policies, or a mixture of both. Additionally, the 
term can have domestic and international connotations regarding government policy. It 
may refer to a state’s policies regarding the logistics of the sale, purchase, transport, and 
consumption of energy as well as the foreign policies linked to achieving energy security. 
Unfortunately, a solid definition of energy politics does not appear in the literature. 
However, by using some of the criteria regarding energy security and policies which 
scholars have discussed one can create a more encompassing definition of energy 
politics.  
Energy security is perhaps the main concern of an energy policy. Brenda Shaffer 
writes that energy security has three main components: reliability of supply, affordability 
of supply, and friendliness of energy policies to the environment (91). For an energy 
source to be reliable it must allow for regular, uninterrupted access to the quality and 
quantity needed by the consumer (Shaffer 93). Affordability requires a price which is not 
only initially affordable, but a price which can also be sustained and promotes economic 
growth over the long term (Shaffer 93). Finally, for an energy source to be 
12 
 
environmentally friendly it must be environmentally sustainable and not harm the public 
health (Shaffer 93).  Shaffer proposes that these three objectives can be achieved through 
diversification of energy sources and supplies, stockpiling of fuel, creation of redundant 
infrastructure to alleviate any disruption in supply or transport, and promotion of 
flexibility in fuel use (93). Energy consumers can achieve the last of these three 
objectives through domestic policies.  
While Shaffer outlines the major goals and purposes of an energy policy, Steve 
Biegun creates what he calls the “Political Paradigm” of an energy policy, highlighting 
the major players and components in energy politics on a macro level. These include the 
energy industry, the public, the interests of producers and processors, the interests of 
trans-shippers and distributers, and the interests of consumers (individuals, corporations, 
and national economies) (219). Biegun also includes specific categories of players for the 
United States such as greens and hawks in the policy making arena and voters as part of 
the public arena (219). Using these two descriptions of different aspects of energy 
politics, a definition comes together. Thus, energy politics is the interconnection between 
domestic energy policies, domestic public policies, international energy policies and 
foreign policies involving the type, quality, quantity, and place of origination of energy 
supplies carried out between consumers, producers, transporters, and distributors. The 
link between energy policies and foreign policies is not just limited to national security 
concerns regarding access to energy supplies. Foreign policies can also be affected by 
how a state acquires energy, where or who the state purchases energy from, and what 
type of energy the state seeks to obtain. Additionally, one state’s energy policies abroad 
may affect another state’s foreign policy objectives in the same region. Unfortunately, the 
13 
 
literature and research on energy politics pays little attention to the latter effects. This 
thesis attempts to fill in this void and explore the effects of energy politics on foreign 
policy objectives. 
Domestic Energy Policies 
 US Senator Thomas “Tip” O’Neill once said “All politics is local” (Cuomo). This 
is true not only for public policy, but for energy politics as well. The domestic energy 
policies and politics of a country can often determine the course of its national energy 
policies. For instance, David Howard Davis argues that energy politics depends on three 
independent variables: physical characteristics, market forces, and general political 
environment (21). Specifically, he points out that American oil companies’ rights to 
access offshore oil became a major election issue in the 1952 presidential race (81). The 
Republicans attacked the inability of the Democratic administration to come to a decision 
and create an effective policy regarding the oil companies’ rights to drill in the tidelands. 
This position won them the support of the oil industry and the Presidency when 
Eisenhower took office (Davis 81). Additionally, Davis claims it isn’t just politicians who 
use energy politics to achieve domestic policy goals. He believes that in the United States 
real and/or false “alarmism” over diminishing energy supplies is used by special interests 
groups such as environmentalists to sway public opinion and support legislation that 
favors their agenda (11).  
While national political issues regarding energy can remain in the domestic arena, 
sometimes such domestic energy politics affect a country’s international energy and 
foreign policies as well. During the 1940’s the impact of the Seven Sisters (the seven 
14 
 
major integrated oil companies) on US foreign policy was clear. Robert Keohane argues 
that it was the effect of the oil industry lobbyists on national politics in America which 
drove US foreign energy policies in the 1940’s as the US became a net importer of oil. 
Keohane points out three specific policy examples, each having a major impact, caused 
by the oil industry. First he notes that the Foreign Operations Committee of the 
Petroleum Administration for War (FOCPAW), which included senior representatives of 
all major international oil companies, thwarted the attempts of the government to 
participate in the oil industry by creating the Petroleum Reserves Corporation. Through 
the FOCPAW the oil companies’ senior leaders effectively prevented the government 
from taking steps to create a government controlled body responsible for the purchase 
foreign oil supplies, even though this may have greatly increased energy security for the 
United States. Even more striking is the fact that this occurred in 1943, when support for 
government initiatives was at a high point during World War II (Keohane 169 – 173). 
Second, Keohane writes that after its failure to create the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation, the US government attempted to develop the Anglo-American Petroleum 
Agreement which would facilitate US access to oil supplies in British spheres of interests, 
notably the Middle East. This was opposed and successfully prevented by the US oil 
industry in order to secure their future contracts with US oil sales (Keohane 173 – 177). 
Finally, Keohane notes that, despite objections by the French, from 1946 - 1948 the US 
State Department supported the violation of the Red Line Agreement in order to support 
Exxon and Mobil’s interests by their entrance into the Aramco consortium (177). 
Keohane concludes that oil policies were not carried out “as state policymakers would 
have preferred: resistance by oil interests led to reliance on the ‘private government of 
15 
 
oil’ … rather than on public authority” despite the United States’ ability to shape oil 
production and marketing to its own interests after WWII (181). 
The literature also notes that domestic government action, such as subsidies and 
nationalization of energy industries can affect international energy politics. For example, 
Brenda Shaffer writes that the United States’ population growth, Asia’s growing 
urbanization, and energy subsidies provided by Asian governments such as China 
increase energy consumption and raise energy prices worldwide (16 - 17). Moreover, 
Shaffer finds that low rates of democracy and high rates of political instability are 
positively correlated with a state being an oil exporter (23 – 26). Additionally, she argues 
that oil importing states are increasingly becoming involved in the affairs of oil exporting 
states because oil importers view their purchase of large quantities of petroleum, and 
subsequent contributions to an oil exporting state’s revenue, as leverage to promote their 
foreign policy goals (29 – 30). According to Shaffer, this can be problematic because 
when a nondemocratic regime uses resources earned from energy exports to maintain 
power and/or an energy exporting state continuously experiences political instability it 
can undermine oil importing countries’ foreign policy efforts to democratize oil exporting 
countries. Such may have been the case with the United States and Nigeria during Sani 
Abacha’s dictatorship. While the United States attempted to promote democracy, 
Abacha’s regime received most of its revenue from oil exports and used this revenue to 
help maintain a tight control of resources and power. However, Shaffer discounts studies 
which have proven a link between energy exports and high levels of intrastate conflict. 
She argues that when variables such as geography are controlled for, or when Russia is 
removed from analysis, the link between secessionist movements, civil war, and intrastate 
16 
 
conflict is much weaker (75 – 77). Finally, Shaffer argues that political instability in an 
energy exporting state can create volatile energy markets, decrease energy security, and 
force energy importing states to change their energy policies. Specifically, she points to 
the examples of oil strikes in Venezuela during 2003 and riots in Nigeria during 2005, 
which raised global oil prices and created petroleum market instability (30).  
National security issues provide another connection between domestic and 
international energy policies. Davis argues that in order for the United States to maintain 
military superiority, the US needs to secure access to oil for its armed forces and for the 
armed forces of its allies (120). However, Davis does not discuss the reverse of his 
argument. If it is in the best interests of the United States to secure energy for its military 
allies, then is it also in the best interests of the United States to deny or minimize its 
competitors’ access to oil in order to stunt their military growth? This is an especially 
valid question in light of the recent Chinese pursuits of foreign energy sources and 
Chinese military growth. However, even if market instability and intrastate conflict are 
affecting energy security and thus national security, David Rothkopf argues that the 
solution does not have to be international in scope. In fact, Rothkopf argues that energy 
security can be achieved through changes in domestic policies, or creating what he calls a 
“new energy paradigm” (192). Rothkopf states three actions which are part of a new 
domestic energy policy: diversification, conservation, and innovation.  Diversification of 
energy sources is to be achieved by obtaining more than one energy type from a variety 
of sources to end dependence on oil and Middle Eastern supplier states (193 – 4). 
Additionally, he argues domestic energy conservation would significantly decrease an oil 
importer’s dependence on foreign energy supplies. For example, he writes that new 
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energy efficient appliances in American homes could eliminate the need for as many as 
40 power plants nationwide equaling the emissions of 12 million cars (195). By 
eliminating greenhouse gases, this initiative would also promote environmental 
friendliness and sustainability, which Brenda Shaffer argues is a key step to enhancing 
energy security (91). Finally, Rothkopf believes innovation will lead to the diversification 
and conservation needed to increase energy security. Notably, he points out that 
increasing fuel efficiency in automobiles to achieve 35 miles per gallon would not only 
cut the amount of imported foreign oil, but would allow the United States to invest the 
money saved from oil imports and potentially create 241,000 jobs nationwide by 2020 
(195). 
International Energy Policies 
Jean-Marie Chevalier predicts that the history of the twenty-first century will be 
shaped through a series of permanent battles and conflicts. Further, he writes many of 
these conflicts will be political clashes between individuals, corporations, and 
government institutions over access to energy resources.  Recent oil consumption and 
growth trends demonstrate that Chevalier’s prediction could be correct. As global oil 
prices and demand continue to rise, the geopolitics of energy is a major concern for both 
net oil importing and net oil exporting countries. Importers and exporters are linked 
together through their international energy policies. Oil exporting countries and oil 
importers are faced with concerns such as preventing the development of resource 
nationalism (the tendency of the state to obtain absolute economic, logistic, and political 
control over natural resource industries), anticipating and planning for changes in the 
security of long-term demand, avoiding the potential political instability that an economy 
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based on a single natural resource can cause and preventing “Dutch Disease” (the 
tendency to overinvest in a resource industry to the detriment of manufacturing industries 
and economic growth) (Chevalier 8; Goldstein et. al 69 -71). 
It is difficult to determine at what point energy policies became more than just 
trade relationships between countries. In the 1920’s, the United States government 
designated federal public lands which produced oil as Naval Petroleum Reserves, from 
which oil could be made available to the US Navy in times of war (Kash and Rycroft 6). 
This legislation shows the government’s recognition of the vital role that oil played in 
national security long before access to oil became a decisive factor in military victory. 
After World War I, despite a surplus of domestic oil production, the United States 
demonstrated clear unease over Britain’s vast global oil operations, especially compared 
to American companies’ minimal presence in overseas oil exploration (Randall 13). The 
link between national security and access to oil was again evident when multiple advisors 
to President Wilson, including the director of research for the American Petroleum 
Institute (API), Harry Garfield, warned the President that nearly forty percent of the 
United States’ domestic oil supply was exhausted and that the US could not afford to 
allow Britain to control the global oil supplies necessary to the maintenance of US 
industries and the US Navy (Randall 13-14). As a result, the API and the American 
Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineering recommended that the United States 
form a more active foreign oil policy, including reciprocity with Britain which would 
allow for mutual concessions on trade restrictions and facilitate the entry of American oil 
companies into overseas oil exploration operations (Randall 16-17). By 1928, the US 
concluded negotiations with Britain and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPC) over 
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American oil companies’ participation in oil exploration and production in Iraq (Randall 
40). Through the 1920’s and 1930’s American oil companies continued to increase 
overseas oil production in the Middle East, Latin America, and in the Dutch East Indies.  
While American oil operations overseas were initially intended to ensure security 
of oil supply and the United States mainly focused on trade policies, the growing US 
presence in the international oil market resulted in increasing ties between oil policy and 
foreign policy. Countries began to realize oil, or denying access to oil, could be employed 
as a weapon. One of the earliest and most notable examples of this link is the United 
State’s oil embargo on Japan in 1941. In response to the Japanese military move into 
South East Asia, the United States placed an oil embargo on Japan (Utley 137). Because 
Japan relied on the US for 80% of its oil supply, the US believed the Japanese military 
would be unable to continue fighting in the war if an oil embargo was enacted (Stern 
1650; Utley 137). The link between energy policies and foreign policies is also evident in 
the energy crisis of 1973 when the oil exporting Arab states instituted an oil embargo on 
the United States to protest US aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War. This link was 
evident again in 1995, when the United States enacted a total embargo on Iran which 
ended purchases of Iranian oil by American companies equaling $4 billion, or one fifth of 
Iran’s oil revenues as a protest to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and support of 
terrorism (“Iran Embargo”). 
Today oil is the most traded commodity in the world (Shaffer 15). With such an 
enormous global market, all countries’ energy policies have an international facet. 
Shaffer claims that because a change in supply and/or demand affects oil prices 
everywhere oil creates an international system of interdependency which thus creates a 
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link between countries foreign and energy policies (28). Oil prices may be cyclical, but 
Shaffer argues that the policies of oil producers and consumers can affect the length of 
the cycle segments, at times creating and maintaining high prices and at other times 
decreasing prices (15). She also points out that with over 75% of the world’s oil 
controlled by state owned companies, importing countries may attempt to coerce others 
to implement domestic policies which are friendly to the importing country’s foreign and 
energy policy goals as the sale of oil to large importers would account for significant 
majority of government revenue for the exporting countries (29). Shaffer discounts 
predictions by Henry Kissinger and U.S. Senator Richard Lugar that future international 
conflicts will be the result of fighting over access to energy sources. She points out that 
such arguments are “antiquated” because oil exporting and oil importing states are too 
economically interdependent to isolate each other through conflict. Further, she argues 
that during a conflict securing energy supplies would require the military strength to 
control access to the natural petroleum resources and to ensure international 
transportation of oil supplies, a task which would be impossible during a time of war 
(67). While Shaffer’s arguments may be true for countries such as Bulgaria seeking to 
assert control over a Russian-supplied natural gas line, they do not necessarily hold for 
countries such as the United States, China, or Russia who have the military capability to 
better control access to energy supplies and the ability to transport energy supplies long 
distances. Shaffer makes an exception for oil producing states which may enter into 
conflict over access to a cross border oil deposit. Shaffer believes that because oil 
deposits could be accessed either partially or fully from either side of a border, 
neighboring states may fight to obtain sole access to the energy supply (68). 
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Current US Energy Policies 
The literature often notes that net oil importers may tie their energy policies to 
their foreign policy objectives. This appears to be the case for the United States. During 
the Reagan administration in the 1980’s the United States initially refused to sanction or 
cut diplomatic ties with South Africa in order to encourage the abolition of apartheid. 
Instead, the Reagan administration employed a policy termed “constructive engagement”, 
in which the US argued it needed to maintain trade and diplomatic relations with South 
Africa if the US was to influence the country’s nationalist white leaders to end South 
Africa’s apartheid system (Ungar and Vale 234). Reagan eventually enacted sanctions 
against South Africa over its failure to abolish apartheid; however, while constructive 
engagement was in effect, US trade with South Africa increased, including the export of 
military equipment (Ungar and Vale 236). Constructive engagement was viewed as a 
major failure and embarrassment in US foreign policy (Ungar and Vale 249-251). More 
recent policy decisions indicate the US has moved away from constructive engagement. 
Brenda Shaffer argues that, while the main concern of US energy policy is to establish 
energy independence, the United States has also used sanctions and market denial against 
energy suppliers to promote its foreign policy (138). Notably, Shaffer points out three 
examples. First, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in 1996 imposed sanctions on companies 
that invested over $20 million annually in Iranian oil. This was a response to Iran’s 
growing nuclear energy program which was deemed a threat to the national security 
interests of the United States and its ally, Israel. Second, she notes the sanctions imposed 
on Sudan in 1997 due to its human rights violations and ongoing genocide (138). Finally, 
as a third example, Shaffer cites the sanctions imposed on Syria in 2003 over its 
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assistance to Saddam Hussein and support for terrorism (138). Although not mentioned 
by Shaffer, another example is the US’s 1995 total trade embargo on Iran due to Iranian 
support of terrorism and development of nuclear weapons (“Iran Embargo”).What 
Shaffer fails to discuss is attempts by the United States, if any, to use its energy policies 
to reward or encourage energy suppliers to pursue policies friendly to US interests, rather 
than punishing suppliers for policies which go against US interests.  
There is some evidence to support the argument that the United States does use its 
energy policies and energy deals as leverage or rewards for those countries which pursue 
policies favorable to the US. At least rhetorically, the United States seeks to utilize its oil 
policies as leverage to pressure African countries to strive for good governance and 
improve human rights records. However, American lawmakers have stated that they 
believe such goals cannot be accomplished unilaterally. Recent US Senate Subcommittee 
on African Affairs meeting minutes reveal a strategy among lawmakers to engage other 
oil importing countries to follow the United States’ lead. A joint statement by James 
Swan and Thomas Christensen notes that the major concerns for the United States 
regarding Chinese energy policies in Africa are issues which affect United States’ foreign 
policy goals for Africa such as promoting democracy, government transparency, and 
human rights. The statement concluded “[W]e engage at multiple levels to influence 
Chinese actions on issues such as good governance, human rights, and transparency – 
issues that we believe should play as prominent a role in Chinese Africa policy as in ours 
[The United States’ policy]”  (“China in Africa” 12). 
In his article, Rothkopf explores possible ways that US energy policies could be 
used to promote other US interests. He lists several links between US foreign policy and 
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energy policy. First, Rothkopf argues that by diversifying US energy supplies to reduce 
the amount of money paid to Middle Eastern suppliers, the United States would limit 
funding provided to Islamic extremist groups (189). Rothkopf also believes that US oil 
imports support international anti-American leaders such as Putin, Chávez, and 
Ahmadinejad. Similar to his argument regarding funding to extremist groups, Rothkopf 
contends that by reducing the amount of oil the United States imports, the US can reduce 
the amount of funding and influence these leaders have (189). Further, he claims that 
reducing our dependence on Middle Eastern oil will reduce the need for the United States 
to intervene militarily in the region to promote or maintain stability (189). But for 
Rothkopf, reducing oil imports could lessen the United States’ involvement in not only 
the Middle East but other regions as well. He asserts that reduced oil imports, replaced by 
renewable energy supplies (wind, hydroelectric, solar, etc.), will lessen the likelihood of 
future conflict between the United States and growing superpowers such as China and 
India over access to energy resources. Rothkopf strongly believes that the development 
and subsequent use of new renewable energy sources would additionally help the United 
States by encouraging the formation of new cooperative relationships, such as the US-
Brazilian effort to develop and promote biofuel use (189 – 90). Finally, Rothkopf 
reiterates the widely accepted belief that reducing dependence on fossil fuels will help 
curb global warming (which he claims to be a key interest of the United States) and 
reduce vulnerability to global economic pressure by decreasing our trade deficits and 
national debt (190).  
However persuasive Rothkopf’s arguments are on the surface, he fails to explore 
several important concerns. First, he fails to fully determine if ceasing to import oil from 
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countries suspected of harboring and supporting terrorism would in turn reduce the 
amount of oil revenues the country receives drastically enough to reverse their support of 
terrorism. With China and India importing increasing amounts of petroleum every year, it 
is possible that any decrease in oil exports from Middle Eastern countries to the United 
States would be offset by increased demand from other countries resulting in little to no 
loss of income for the suppliers. However, even if this is not the case then there still 
remains a problem with Rothkopf’s argument. If the United States does purchase enough 
oil to seriously impact a Middle Eastern country’s revenue and the loss of profits of these 
imports cannot be balanced by increased oil imports from another country such as China, 
then that suggests a situation in which the United States can use its oil imports as 
important and valuable leverage to its advantage when negotiating with Middle Eastern 
countries over matters of national security such as the global war on terrorism. Rothkopf 
also fails to explore the consequences of developing alternative energy supplies. 
Currently, the infrastructure needed to the power the country with renewable energy is 
not in place. Additionally, a renewable energy source for mass transit and personal 
vehicles is not widely available or widely utilized. The United States will not be able to 
reduce oil imports until renewable energy is logistically feasible.  
Current Chinese Energy Policies 
Some research argues that, unlike the United States, China is not seeking to use its 
energy policies as leverage to promote democracy. For example, the EIA states that 
China’s demand for and reliance on oil imports drive Chinese energy policies.  However, 
this does not necessarily mean that Chinese energy policy drives Chinese foreign policy. 
In 1954, Chinese leader Mao Zedong announced the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
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Coexistence.” One of these principles is non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs. 
The principles set a standard for Chinese foreign relations. While the non-interference 
policy was originally intended to support China’s foreign policy with India regarding 
Tibet, it was soon applied to Sino-African relations and embraced by African countries in 
1955 at the Asian-African Bandung Conference (Raine 15).  
Over the years, Chinese policy has varied in rhetoric and practice. Early in Sino-
African relations, Mao Zedong advocated Chinese support of African independence 
movements (Raine 16). This is non-interventionist policy has its roots in the beginnings 
of China’s soft power policy. For Mao, and for China today, employing soft power means 
the use of any means outside of the military and security realm which would increase 
China’s attractiveness, or “name brand”, to other countries (Kurlantzick 5-6). In 1955 at 
the Bandung Conference, in an attempt to develop closer ties with other developing 
countries, China promoted itself as a model for African and Asian developing countries 
(Kurlantzick 13). Although China imported no oil in the 1950’s, international 
conferences such as this set the stage for China to increase the attractiveness of its name 
brand as a model for economic and social development. China’s model is especially 
attractive to authoritarian regimes in developing nations as it does not call for political 
liberalization (Kurlantzick 56-57). Moreover, China’s respect for sovereignty along with 
foreign aid was an attractive policy for post-colonial African states emerging at the time.  
In 1964, while visiting Somalia during a tour of Africa, Premier Zhou Enlai announced 
the “Eight Principles Governing China’s Economic and Technological Assistance to 
Foreign Countries”, which slightly expanded the policy set forth in the “Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence” by mandating that a recipient government’s sovereignty would 
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be respected by China when receiving foreign aid (Raine 17). However, China’s soft 
power was not always successful. In the mid-1970’s, Chinese support of revolutionary 
movements in African countries alienated many national governments which cut off ties 
with China until the 1980’s when Deng Xiaoping assumed political power in China and 
improved China’s international image by maintaining a low profile in global affairs 
(Kurlantzick 14, 16-17).  
In the late 1980’s and mid-1990’s, younger and more educated Chinese rose to 
positions of political power in China (Kurlantzick 30-31). These more educated 
politicians, often Western educated, believed China could no longer rely on the US and 
should instead take a more active role in international politics than it had during Deng’s 
leadership. In the early 2000’s China began a policy that Joshua Kurlantzick terms the 
“Charm Offensive,” a policy in which wooing, not intimidating, would be the method of 
achieving peace, stability, and development (37-39). Chinese President Hu Jintao 
expanded China’s Eight Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and hinted at this new, active 
role in international politics at the Forum on China-African Cooperation in November of 
2006 when he announced the “Six Pillars of Sino-African Relations,” which reiterated 
non-interference, emphasized African ownership of African problems, and called upon 
the international community to pay closer attention to African issues and promote African 
development (Corkin 2). It was also during this time that China’s soft power began to 
focus not only on peace and stability, but on the need for natural resources and China’s 
dependence on imported energy. In 2006 alone, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao mentioned 
China’s dependence on mineral imports 28 times in his speeches. Even more telling, Wen 
created an internal Chinese government task force staffed by prominent Chinese officials 
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to focus on China’s growing energy needs (Kurlantzick 40-41). To help meet its energy 
needs, China employed soft power in the form of business development and financial aid. 
Between 2002 and 2007, Chinese firms purchased $15 billion in oil and gas fields and 
companies worldwide (Kurlantzick 90). By 2007, nine hundred Chinese companies were 
invested in Africa (Kurlantzick 88). Business development and aid weren’t solely 
directed to African countries, but to other developing countries as well. In 2004 Hu Jintao 
pledged $100 billion in investment to Argentina and Brazil while the same year China 
provided $1.5 billion in aid to Asian countries (Kurlantzick 87, 98). 
China’s focus on energy continues. Recently has China reestablished a National 
Energy Commission, effective 27 January 2010 (Zhiyue 2). Chinese oil policies are 
complicated by the fact that it is national oil companies, not necessarily the Chinese 
government, that make energy policy decisions, especially abroad (Shaffer 147). Some 
scholars, such as Bo Kong, closely examine the role that Chinese national oil companies 
(NOC’s) play in the formation for Chinese petroleum policies. Kong argues that currently 
the Chinese national government and Chinese NOC’s co-govern and co-implement 
Chinese oil policies (5-6). Kong writes that the increasing complexity and subsequent 
problems in the Chinese oil industry were due to four factors: supply and demand were 
preset by a government planned target, lack of incentive to increase production due to 
artificially low pricing strategy created by the government, lack of funding by the 
Chinese government (the sole source of investment in the oil industry), and the soaring 
costs associated with the Chinese Petroleum Administration Bureau’s (PABs) mass oil 
exploration campaigns (9). To address these concerns China created three NOC’s: China 
National Oil Offshore Corporation (CNOOC), Sinopec, and China National Petroleum 
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Corporation (CNPC) (Kong 9).  According to Kong, the decentralization of China’s oil 
industry reduced the central government’s power over the national oil companies and the 
oil industry as a whole (10).  
China’s National Energy Administration (NEA) maintains vice-ministerial status 
which gives it authority over lower ranking petroleum bureaucracies while allowing the 
NOCs to retain all operational autonomy (Kong 18-19). Kong argues that this created a 
split in interests between the national oil companies and the Chinese government. While 
the NOCs are seeking to implement oil policies which promote commercial interests, the 
Chinese government is pursuing policies which serve both the economic and political 
interests of the China (Kong 23). For example, one purpose of the Chinese national oil 
companies is to ensure that between one-third and one-half of China’s total oil imports 
will be comprised of “equity oil” or the portion of crude production that Chinese NOCs 
have the legal and contractual right to retain or sell as a guarantee on investment under 
the production-sharing agreements (Kong 92).  While “equity oil” will cut down the total 
amount of oil Chinese NOCs can sell on the international market, it will increase energy 
security for China during times of market turbulence and instability. However, to 
reinforce its grip on strategic control of the oil industry, the CPC established Discipline 
and Inspection Groups which act as a watchdog for all state owned assets in each of the 
three NOCs and their subsidiaries and bear the responsibility of ensuring that all of the 
national oil companies’ strategic decisions fall in line with CPC policies (Kong 25). 
Not all scholars agree with Kong that Chinese NOC interests and the interests of 
the Chinese government will diverge. Some scholars argue that the Chinese government 
and Chinese NOCs’ policies coincide and thus can be easily analyzed and predicted. For 
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example, in their article, “Searching for Oil: China’s Oil Strategies in Africa,” Henry Lee 
and Dan Shalmon argue that China’s state strategic control over Chinese NOCs will 
necessitate a combination of oil policies with Chinese foreign policies in both the 
economic and diplomatic realms (Lee and Shalmon 111). Even though Lee and Shalmon 
acknowledge that the Chinese government turned over operational control to the Chinese 
NOCs, they assert that because the Chinese government can intervene legally in the 
business operations of the NOCs and because most senior officials at Chinese NOCs 
aspire to be government officials, the influence of the Chinese government is impossible 
for the NOCs to ignore (Lee and Shalmon 114). This influence in turn almost always 
assures that Chinese NOCs will practice the policies in line with those of the Chinese 
government.  
However, even if the interests of the NOCs and the Chinese government may 
sometimes diverge, one can forecast and analyze Chinese petroleum policies by 
observing the policies of the Chinese government since the government has retained 
strategic control over the NOCs’ operations. One of the most pressing concerns for the 
Chinese government is energy security. To address this concern the government has 
instituted a “going out” policy for Chinese NOCs (Shaffer 145). On October 11, 2000, 
Chinese President Jiang explained that insufficient Chinese domestic oil supplies, 
international oil shortages, and increasing fluctuations in the international oil markets 
made it strategically necessary for China to “‘go out,’ actively explore and develop 
resources abroad through various means, and diversify petroleum imports” in order to 
sustain the current levels of economic growth in China (Kong 46). Kong argues that the 
“going out” strategy has become China’s official petroleum policy, evidenced by its 
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enshrinement in the Tenth Five-Year Plan in March 2001. In the Tenth Five-Year Plan, 
the Chinese government proposed that China more actively utilize foreign oil resources, 
establish overseas oil supply bases, and diversify sources of petroleum imports among 
other initiatives as methods to enhance petroleum supply and guarantee energy security 
(“Tenth Five-Year Plan”). Like Kong, Lee and Shalmon believe that China’s struggle 
with localized energy shortages and their reliance on petroleum to fuel its booming 
economy and population growth have driven China to actively seek oil supplies from 
abroad (110 – 111).  They argue that a central element of China’s energy policy is a 
“going abroad” strategy to seek foreign sources of petroleum from areas where oil 
reserves are expected to grow and where China can exert more influence than other oil 
importing countries, specifically Western countries (113-114). Shaffer also finds that 
China’s overall energy policy now includes a “going out” strategy. Specifically, she notes 
that the growing Chinese demand for imported oil has led Beijing to pursue long-term oil 
supply contracts with foreign production companies instead of relying on short-term 
market exchanges for oil to guarantee energy security (Shaffer 146).  
By exploring Chinese government documents, such as the Special Energy Plan for 
the Tenth Five-Year Plan, Kong finds three strategies among the Chinese government’s 
international petroleum policies have led China to allocate more overseas oil investment 
from 1992 – 2009 in Africa than any other region of the world: China’s going-out 
strategy, diversification goal, and desire for globally competitive flagship oil companies 
(Kong 58, 65). To facilitate their African oil investments, Kong finds that Chinese NOC’s 
and the Chinese government have employed a tactic known as petroleum diplomacy. 
Kong defines China’s petroleum diplomacy as the intersection between the pursuit of one 
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country’s petroleum interests and its diplomatic interests, with one morphing into the 
realm of the other (117). Both oil importing and oil exporting countries engage in 
petroleum diplomacy, but for oil importing countries, Kong argues, diplomacy supplies 
the means to petroleum supplies, the end (118).   
Other scholars agree with many of the previous authors’ assessments regarding 
China’s petroleum policy. For example, in her article “New Africa Policy: China’s Quest 
for Oil and Influence,” Wei Liang examines a slew of recent Chinese foreign aid to 
Africa. Liang argues that the billions of dollars spent in aid to Africa cover not just the 
same areas as Western donors, such as health care and education, but also areas which 
Western donors have long ignored, such as infrastructure, industry, and agriculture (159-
60). Liang believes much of China’s foreign aid is given as means to exert influence to 
increase trade, especially in petroleum. Wenran Jiang’s article “China’s Emerging 
Partnerships in Africa” corroborates Liang’s argument. Jiang points out that China has 
provided African countries with over $44 billion in aid for approximately 900 
infrastructure projects in the past 50 years and that over half of China’s $950 million in 
aid went to African countries in 2005 (52 - 3). Further, he lists a slew of aid projects 
which Chinese President Hu promised to Africa as part of China’s “Year of Africa” 2006 
gathering in Beijing (52). These included doubling bilateral trade by 2010, establishing a 
$5 billion China-Africa development fund, working with African governments to 
establish Special Economic Zones in Africa to facilitate trade, providing $3 billion in 
preferential loans to Africa, cancelling $1 billion in African debt, signing trade deals 
worth $1.9 billion, providing a $37.5 million grant for antimalarial drugs, building 30 
hospitals and 30 additional treatment centers for malaria, building 100 rural schools and 
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doubling the number of scholarships for study abroad students from Africa in China (52-
3). 
Like Wei Liang, Jiang also believes China’s investment in Africa comes with a 
price tag. China expects access to natural resources, most importantly oil, in return for 
their aid. Underscoring this point, he writes that in 2003 President Hu and Premier Wen 
traveled with Chinese oil executives to several oil-producing African states and three 
years later, in 2006, Africa supplied nearly 30 percent of China’s total oil imports (53). 
Agreeing with Jiang, Liang believes this aid was given primarily for access to oil. In fact, 
Liang goes as far as to claim that natural resources, notably oil, are the most significant 
factor in China’s renewed interest in Africa (158). However, according to Liang, natural 
resources are not the sole factor in China’s activity in Africa. Another benefit of 
increasing aid to African countries is opening up a new export markets. China is 
continuously seeking to find new markets for their growing exports, and African 
countries’ developing economies provide an excellent customer base for their 
inexpensive manufactured goods (Liang 161). While Liang does not formally define 
China’s activities in Africa as petroleum diplomacy, her description of China’s practice 
of giving aid in return for oil and political recognition falls completely within the 
parameters of the petroleum diplomacy described by Kong. 
Kong claims that the Chinese government varies its petroleum diplomacy tactics 
in three ways, depending on the type of oil exporting state with which the Chinese 
government is engaging. One set of tactics is used for oil rich countries, another for oil 
transporting countries, and a third set for countries over which China’s pursuit of oil may 
conflict with a third party’s interest (119). For example, Kong points out that Sinopec’s 
33 
 
expansion in Iran has aroused protests from the United States (120). Chinese petroleum 
diplomacy with Africa falls under the first set of tactics. China’s bilateral petroleum 
diplomacy with oil rich African countries includes high level official visits, 
developmental aid, debt cancellation, zero and low interests loans, and infrastructure 
development financing (Kong 121). Tactics such as the ones Kong describes help to 
achieve the political image that Liang argues China is attempting to create of itself in 
Africa, via soft power. According to Liang, there are five components to this political 
image. First, China is attempting to capitalize on its image as a ‘Cold War’ friend to 
Africa and benefit from the investment it gave during the 1960’s, despite struggling with 
its own poverty (162). Other components of its desired political image include non-
interference, promotion of equality and partnership, persuasion over coercion, and 
mutually beneficial “win-win” relationships (Liang 161-63). However, Liang warns that 
China’s policy of noninterference may become its own undoing. She writes that tensions 
among sub-state and non-state actors who wish to retain or regain regional control over 
oil resources (for example the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) in 
Africa have worsened due to China’s state-centric involvement on the continent (167). In 
support of this argument, Liang cites a poll conducted in ten Cameroonian cities in which 
over three-fourths of the respondents believed China does not help the local economy 
(167). Further, she points out that non-governmental organizations have accused China of 
racism and neo-colonialism, claiming that China either lacks the capacity or willfully 
chooses not to engage domestic groups and civil society (167). If China wishes to create 
an image of partnership and equality, continued and growing frustration among 
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grassroots groups in Africa may ultimately work to escalate domestic conflict and 
subsequently hinder the development of strong Sino-African relationships. 
Despite the continuous updates to China’s Five-Year Plans, multiple changes to 
the state energy bureaucracy, and the creation of Chinese national oil companies, the 
rhetoric of China’s policy of non-interference remains largely unchanged since China 
became a net importer of oil in 1993. If Chinese policy is taken at face value, it appears 
extremely unlikely that China will use its energy policies as leverage to encourage 
African governments to meet good governance and human rights standards as the United 
States wishes. If the literature is correct, it seems most likely that China will use its 
economic influence and foreign relations as tools to promote petroleum diplomacy and 
secure long-term petroleum supplies from abroad. 
Chinese Impact on American Foreign Policy Objectives 
Minimal to No Impact 
Scholars and researchers disagree over the impact that Chinese economic 
involvement in Africa has had and/or will have on US foreign policy objectives in Africa. 
Additionally, disagreement exists regarding the impact of Chinese economic involvement 
on the level of oil exports the US receives from Africa. One argument advanced by 
researchers such as Erica Downs is that, while Chinese importation and consumption of 
oil is increasing, China poses no threat to US access to African oil exports nor does it 
hinder American foreign policy objectives in Africa. Downs claims that Chinese oil 
companies are not dominating the oil industry in Africa (43 – 44). Rather, Downs notes 
that Chinese NOCs are minor actors in many African oil producing states, including 
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Nigeria, Angola, and Sudan (44). Raine also finds that skeptics of the Chinese impact in 
Africa have some convincing statistics on their side. The majority of African oil exports 
currently to go to the United States and the European Union. Additionally, Western oil 
companies in Africa still produce more oil than Chinese NOCs (Raine 52). Raine also 
notes that some statistics demonstrate that the level of Chinese economic involvement in 
Africa is rather minimal. For example, Raine points out that African bilateral trade with 
China does not exceed the bilateral trade with South Korea, and that only 3% of Chinese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) went to Africa in 2005 (Raine 52). A report by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development found that Chinese FDI to Africa 
remained the same in 2007, at 3% of China’s total FDI (“Asian Foreign Direct 
Investment”). 
Other scholars maintain that China’s economic impact in Africa is significant, but 
claim that it can be beneficial for African states. For example, in her article “Is China the 
Key to Africa’s Development?” Eliza Barclay argues that increased trade with China 
could improve living conditions for Africans. She writes that cheap Chinese imports 
entering African markets create an opportunity for poor and middle-class Africans to buy 
goods they otherwise could not afford. While Barclay admits that the advantages of 
natural resource export economies do not often benefit the African working class, she 
believes steps can be taken to maximize these benefits for communities as a whole. For 
instance, Barclay advocates processing natural resources before exporting them to 
increase the number of jobs available to Africans. However, Barclay does not explore the 
possibility that this solution may lead to the development of “Dutch Disease,” or an 
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overinvestment in resource industries which causes economic detriment to a state’s other 
industrial and agricultural sectors. 
Shaffer argues that the development of Dutch Disease causes political instability 
and economic instability. First, because after an overinvestment in the energy sector and 
volatile oil prices, a major price drop in the oil industry can crash the economy and make 
long term stability impossible (20). She writes that a price drop and lowered resource 
derived revenue make it impossible for the government of an oil exporting state to meet 
public demands, resulting in civil unrest (20).  Further, the exporting state does not 
perform well economically because energy exports create little employment opportunities 
for the populace, provide little incentive for economic reform during boom periods, and 
provide little means for economic reform when prices fall (20). Finally, Shaffer argues 
that during boom periods, the government of an energy exporting state is likely to seize 
control and nationalize the energy sector in order to profit as much as possible from high 
prices, a process that she refers to as resource nationalism (30).  
Other scholars, such as Marie-Claire Aoun, have found high levels of corruption 
when resource nationalism occurs. Aoun examines how the domestic policies of oil-
producing Middle Eastern and North African countries can lead to poor governance. She 
notes that countries which are major oil exporters ranked among the lowest scores for 
good governance. Aoun argues that oil rich countries often struggle with implementing 
democratic, transparent government institutions and experience civil conflict or political 
instability (154). One reason this occurs, according to Aoun, is because oil producing 
countries develop rent-seeking policies which substitute dependence on taxation for 
dependence on oil revenues for income (157). According to Aoun, this dependence on oil 
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revenues is associated with higher levels of corruption and decreased transparency 
because money is often channeled to individuals or groups in power. Further, Aoun notes 
that the corruption associated with increasing oil revenues can lead to institutional 
collapse and cause civil and/or political unrest (160). Aoun’s argument implies the 
impact of China on each case’s Freedom House scores may be negligible or even 
nonexistent. 
In his book, State Power, Autarchy, and Political Conquest in Nigerian 
Federalism, Kalu Kalu makes a similar argument to Aoun’s. Kalu argues that Nigeria’s 
poor governance and civil violence is due to rentier policies that are created by and 
inherent of systemic and structural problems in Nigerian governments. For example, he 
argues that it was the creation of twelve states by General Gowon in 1967 which “used 
the territorial location of oil resources as its primary criteria in the political and economic 
dismemberment of the Eastern Region” turning “a war fought for the preservation of 
rights” into the Biafran War, a “war over oil and territorial control” (Kalu 126). 
According to Kalu, the link between territory, resources, and political power created a 
cycle of prevalent government corruption established by the military and perpetuated by 
civilian government officials upon taking office (Kalu 2). He characterizes this corruption 
cycle as political mining, or “the relentless quest and use of politics as means of securing 
instrumental rewards” (Kalu 128). While Kalu acknowledges the role oil has played in 
supporting flawed anti-democratic government in Nigeria, he argues that the policies of 
the states which buy Nigerian oil matter very little or not at all if the Nigerian 
government remains corrupt and systemic flaws remain unaddressed.  
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One can infer from the above arguments of Shaffer, Aoun, and Kalu, that it is not 
simply the policies or agendas of oil importing countries which may destabilize an oil 
exporting country. Oil exports may be an intrinsic source of instability, regardless of 
other countries’ foreign policies or economic involvement. If the development of Dutch 
Disease (and the poor governance which is often found alongside it) is linked intrinsically 
to the possession of high priced natural resources, then the impact of a Chinese economic 
presence may do little to influence the accomplishment of US foreign policy goals. For 
example, if the United States is seeking to democratize and stabilize a country which 
happens to be a major oil exporter, such as Iraq, the main obstacle is the corruption and 
political unrest resulting for poor management of natural resources, not the influence of 
third parties importing goods from the country. 
Another argument is that the extent of Chinese economic involvement, 
specifically foreign aid, and their political motives (i.e. reducing the number of states 
which officially recognize Taiwan as an independent state) in Africa is overblown. A 
skeptic of the potential impact of Chinese economic involvement, Thomas J. Christensen, 
testified to Congress that China’s foreign aid to Africa should be kept in perspective, as it 
amounts to only a third, at the most, of the amount of foreign aid the United States 
contributes each year to Africa (“China in Africa” 5). Further, Christensen noted that 
taken as a whole, the oil production of Chinese NOC’s in Africa amounts to only one 
third of the total production of ExxonMobil alone (“China in Africa” 5). Erica Downs 
agrees with Christensen and argues that China has no anti-Western motives in its search 
for African oil supplies. In her research, Downs finds that the Chinese government does 
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not have a “highly coordinated” oil policy which is removing oil from the world markets 
and such an impact is highly exaggerated (Downs 52).  
According to Kong, China’s latecomer status to the international oil market has 
caused China to pursue oil in countries not already dominated by Western oil interests 
(133). Kong argues that China’s presence in countries such as Sudan and Iran implicate 
Beijing in local conflicts even if China’s oil policies have had little to no impact. To 
counter this negative perception of its petroleum policies, Kong argues that China is 
attempting to work multilaterally to promote stability in oil producing countries. For 
example, he notes President Hu’s proposal at a 17 July 2006 meeting of the Group of 
Eight which called upon the international community to cooperatively promote stability 
and security in oil producing countries, specifically the Middle East (136). However, 
Kong does not address other motives for China’s proposal, notably, the difference 
between Chinese rhetoric and action. China has done little to promote stability in Sudan, 
for example, despite the international community’s pressure to use their economic 
influence to help end the crisis in Darfur. Additionally, Kong’s interpretation of Hu’s 
proposal as a means to mitigate China’s implication in international crises seems naïve. 
An alternative interpretation could also be that China benefits greatly from increased 
stability and security in oil producing states. The greater the stability and security in an 
oil producing state, the greater the stability and security of China’s oil supply from that 
state. The difference between Chinese policy in rhetoric and practice, notably on a case 
by case basis, is a significant gap in the literature on Chinese petroleum diplomacy. 
Unfortunately, Kong does not discuss any alternative interpretations, nor does any of the 
other literature on this subject.  
40 
 
Significant Impact  
 Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
demonstrates that from 1995 to 2004, oil imports to industrialized countries fell for all oil 
exporting African countries with the exception of Zambia. Further, their data show that, 
with the exception of Nigeria and Zambia, oil exports to China rose significantly for all 
oil exporting African countries during the same time period (Goldstein et. al 46). It could 
be argued that this increase in oil exports to China is due more to the growth of China’s 
domestic markets and G.D.P than a Chinese economic presence in Africa. However, the 
same study also demonstrates that oil exports from African countries to India have 
decreased for five out of nine oil exporting states despite the fact that both India and 
China have experienced similar gross domestic product growth rates (Goldstein et al 47). 
Even though Raine addresses current statistics which demonstrate that the impact of 
China may be overblown, she finds that, when projected into the future, statistics support 
arguments that China’s economic engagement in Africa and demand for African oil 
imports could create competition with the United States. Specifically, Raine points to the 
World Energy Outlook Report from 2007 which projected that China will need to import 
80% of its oil by 2030 if China’s gross domestic product and population growth increase 
steadily over the next 20 years (Raine 53; World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India 
Insights 284). Raine notes that China’s government pledges to increase African oil 
imports by 7% within five to ten years, while the US intends to increase African oil 
imports 10% by 2015 (53). Additionally, Raine states that Africa’s total number of all 
exports to China are increasing at two and half times the rate of Africa’s total number of 
all exports to the US and four and a half times the rate of Africa’s total number of all 
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exports to the European Union (53). These projections support concerns that China and 
the United States may soon be competing for the same African oil exports. Moreover, 
China seeks not only to increase oil imports from Africa, but also to increase and 
strengthen its economic presence on the continent by engaging in African markets and 
developing Chinese NOCs within Africa. The China Daily, a state controlled newspaper 
responsible for reporting on Chinese government policies for English-speaking 
audiences, confirms that China seeks to increase its total trade with Africa. In 2007, the 
newspaper reported that Chinese trade with Africa is set to top $100 billion by 2010 
(“China's FDI in Africa”). This figure was already achieved by 2008, when Chinese trade 
with Africa reached a record $106 billion, an increase of 45% from 2007 (“China-Africa 
Trade Up”). 
In light of these statistics, some scholars believe that increased levels of Chinese 
oil imports from and an increased Chinese economic presence in African oil producing 
states directly affects US supplies of oil and hinders the success of US policy goals in 
these countries. One such view holds that foreign aid may hinder the development of 
democracy if donor countries are not sincere in their commitment to reform. For 
example, Thad Dunning writes that when two opposing donors are competing for 
influence within the same region, one donor’s commitment to reform may waiver if 
imposing such reform results in losing leverage over the recipient country to the opposing 
donor country (Dunning 411). Such is the case in Africa today. American lawmakers 
have advocated using American energy policies and foreign aid to achieve foreign policy 
objectives in Africa such as promoting good governance and human rights, encouraging 
governments to take steps toward democracy or ensuring democratic governments remain 
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in power, and exerting pressure on Sudan to peacefully resolve the crisis in Darfur. 
However, as Raine explains, contemporary Chinese policy regarding its economic 
presence in Africa stems from Zhou’s “Eight Principles Governing China’s Economic 
and Technological Assistance to Foreign Countries” which requires China to respect a 
recipient state’s sovereignty (7). Therefore, the presence of Chinese involvement in the 
oil sector plus Chinese foreign aid coupled with a policy of non-involvement may make it 
impossible for the alternate US influence to exert the required pressure to urge African 
governments to reform.  
Wei Liang also agrees that China’s involvement in Africa can pose challenges to 
US foreign policy. She notes that the absence of democracy, human rights protection, 
industry deregulation and privatization as prerequisites to trade and investment, make 
China a more attractive trading partner than many Western countries (164). Specifically, 
she notes that China’s tolerance of rogue states such as Sudan, despite grave human 
rights violations, along with China’s use of soft loans and political support provide 
African governments with alternative offers and more leverage to resist Western pressure 
for domestic reforms and democratization (165). Liang argues that by increasing their 
relations with rogue states, China also increases its leverage with the United States and its 
importance in international affairs, evidenced by the fact that the US now sees China as a 
key player in convincing the Sudanese government to end the conflict in Darfur (165). At 
the very least, Liang claims, China is providing African countries with an alternative 
political model of a non-democratic, but economically thriving state, a sharp contrast to 
the democratic capitalist model Western countries wish to promote (164).  
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While Shaffer generally argues that Dutch Disease can be an intrinsic source of 
instability, she finds that in the case of many developing countries China’s policy of 
noninterference is undermining US efforts to promote human rights and democracy 
abroad. She points specifically to a 2006 report by the U.S. Department of Energy which 
states that Chinese ties with rogue oil producing states “runs counter to key strategic 
goals of the United States” (85). Despite this argument, Shaffer concludes that China and 
the United States have more shared interests than not and conflict between the two 
countries over energy is unlikely. First, she notes that oil is likely the only energy source 
over which the two would come into conflict as they do not compete for other energy 
resources (86). Thus Shaffer finds that the world supply of oil is able to currently meet 
and actually supersede global demand, reducing the potential for conflict over access to 
oil supplies (87). One concern about future conflict Shaffer expresses is that China relies 
on long-term sales arrangements with oil suppliers, rather than international oil markets 
to acquire its supplies (87). This diminishes the amount of oil available for export to other 
countries. Although, as noted earlier, scholars such as Kong find that currently and in the 
near future, most of China’s oil equity acquired through long-term sales contracts will be 
sold on the international market. While Shaffer may be correct in asserting that the 
United States and China will not engage in conflict over access to oil, her assessment 
completely ignores the possible effects of China’s petroleum diplomacy in Africa on US 
foreign policy objectives. 
Gaps in Research 
While much has been written on Chinese petroleum diplomacy in Africa, very 
little research has covered the impact of China’s petroleum diplomacy on US foreign 
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policy objectives. A systematic study of the effects China’s petroleum diplomacy and 
how it may or may not impact the foreign policy goals of the United States in Africa 
remains to be completed. Such a study is difficult to conduct due to the scarcity of data. 
The Chinese government does not release commodity-specific trade statistics and few 
sources exist which provide a complete historical set of Chinese trade data. This thesis 
will conduct such a study to determine if an increased Chinese economic presence in 
Nigeria has impacted US foreign policy objectives. This study will use statistical analysis 
coupled with qualitative process tracing to determine if a correlation exists between an 
increased Chinese economic presence and less democracy, worsening human rights 
records, and less transparency among national governments in Nigeria.
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III 
NIGERIA 
 This chapter presents a correlation between Chinese economic involvement with 
Nigeria (measured by the total amount of oil exports and overall exports from Nigeria to 
China and the by the percentage of total exports from Nigeria to China) and Nigeria’s 
Freedom House scores. Freedom House releases annual reports assessing countries’ 
democratic freedom by analyzing multiple components of political and civil liberties. As 
discussed earlier, US foreign policy goals in Nigeria are similar in rhetoric to the 
components which Freedom House assesses in its political rights and civil liberties 
ratings. For example, in assessing a country’s political rights, Freedom House examines 
the extent to which voting is free, fair, and universal. Similarly, the United States 
promotes free and fair elections in its foreign policy. The extent to which US foreign 
policy varies in practice from its rhetoric is examined later in the process tracing section. 
Presentation of Statistics 
Freedom House ratings are conducted on a scale of one through seven, with seven 
being the least free. Nigeria’s Freedom House political rating and Freedom House civil 
liberty rating were each independently correlated with the percentage of Nigeria’s total 
exports which went to China, the US dollar amount of exports to China, and the amount 
of oil exports in US dollars to China for the time period of 1993-2010. 
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Explanation of Data 
 Scores for all independent variables improved overall in the long term for the 
years covered in this study (see Figure 6). The correlation between Nigeria’s Freedom 
House political rights scores and the percentage of Nigeria’s total exports to China, the 
correlation between Nigeria’s Freedom House civil liberties score and the percentage of 
Nigeria’s total exports to China, and the correlation between Nigeria’s Freedom House 
civil liberties score and Nigeria’s total exports to China are not statistically significant. 
However, three of the correlations are statistically significant (see Table 1). Nigeria’s 
Freedom House political rights rating is negatively correlated with the total exports to 
China (measured in USD) and to the amount of Nigerian oil exports to China (measured 
in USD). Additionally, Nigeria’s Freedom House civil liberty rating is also negatively 
correlated to the amount of Nigerian oil exports to China (measured in USD). These three 
statistically significant correlations indicate that increased Chinese economic 
involvement, notably in Nigeria’s oil industry, may have a positive impact on Nigeria’s 
Freedom House ratings. Thus, contrary to this study’s hypothesis, increased Chinese 
economic involvement in Nigeria’s petroleum industry is correlated which improving 
Freedom House political rights ratings and improving Freedom House civil liberties 
ratings. While this correlation is surprising, Nigeria’s improved Freedom House ratings 
could be due to several factors, notably the end of military rule followed by the creation 
of Nigeria’s constitution and establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1999. 
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Figure 6. Nigerian Dependent Variables Over Time
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 Percentage of Total 
Exports to China 
Total Exports to 
China (Measured 
in US Dollars) 
Oil Exports to 
China (Measured 
in US Dollars) 
Freedom House 
Political Rights 
Rating 
Pearson Correlation: 
-.541 
P-Value
8
  = .056 
Pearson Correlation: 
-.496 
P-Value = .036 
Pearson Correlation:  
-.570 
P-Value = .014 
Freedom House 
Civil Liberty 
Rating 
Pearson Correlation:  
-.492 
P-Value = .088 
Pearson Correlation:  
-.464 
P-Value = .053 
Pearson Correlation:  
-.537 
P-Value = .022 
Table 1. Correlation of Dependent and Independent Variables in the Nigeria Case Study
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While the data show intriguing trends and several statistically significant 
correlations, the data are still weak and incomplete (See Appendix Tables A1 and A2). 
                                                 
7
 Data in Figure 6 is derived from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Reports for the years 1993 
through 2010. Report is available online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. 
8
 Pearson’s P-Value is the likelihood that the statistical correlation observed is due to chance. A P-Value ≤ 
.05 is considered the threshold to determine statistical significance of correlation. 
9
 Data in Table 1 is derived from the author’s calculations of the correlations between Nigeria’s Freedom 
House scores (obtained from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Reports for the years 1993 through 
2010) and Nigerian export data (obtained from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database). 
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An additional problem is that the data are only available for a 17 year period, which 
significantly limits the amount of data for statistical analysis. In order to identify and 
better understand the trends of dependable variables and apparent statistically significant 
correlations, process tracing of historical, qualitative data is used to examine and expose 
possible reasons for each dependable variable data set and statistically significant 
correlation. 
Lack of Statistical Significance, Gaps in Data 
While this study finds three statistically significant correlations it also finds three 
of the correlations are not statistically significant. The dependent variables did not have a 
statistically significant correlation with the percentage of total Nigerian exports to China 
while Nigeria’s Freedom House civil liberties rating did not have a statistically 
significant correlation with Nigeria’s total exports to China measured in US dollars. 
Additionally, there are gaps in the data which hinder statistical analysis in this case study. 
Notably, the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database only contains 
information on Nigeria’s total petroleum exports to the world for the years 2006 - 2010. 
There exists no other publically accessible database which measures total Nigerian oil 
exports in US Dollars with which the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database could be combined to determine the percentage of Nigerian oil exports which 
China imported from 1993 – 2005. Moreover, intervening variables such as regime 
change and political and civil instability may likely have negatively impacted both 
Nigeria’s Freedom House scores.  Consequently, the absence of some export data and the 
impact of possible intervening variables give this study’s process tracing more relevance. 
The following section provides a brief post-colonial history of Nigeria through 1993 
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followed by a qualitative, historical process tracing for the years 1993 through 2010 in 
which this study examines intervening variables to determine the impact of Chinese 
involvement in Nigeria’s oil industry on Nigeria’s Freedom House political liberties and 
civil rights scores. 
Background 
While Nigeria’s history is too rich and complex to permit a thorough discussion 
here, a brief look at its post-colonial past up to 1993  helps to provide a basis of 
understanding for its current socio-economic and political climate. The following history 
is organized by political regime changes in Nigerian history. This case study also 
examines the development of Nigeria’s oil industry and role Nigeria’s petroleum 
resources have played as a source of power and wealth for both military and civilian 
political leaders and regimes, contributing to political instability and regional violence. 
1960 – 1978: Independence, the First Republic, and Military Rule 
Nigeria gained its independence from Great Britain on 01 October 1960 and 
entered into the period known as the First Republic (1960 – 1966) (Akinwumi 57). The 
Nigerian state created upon independence in 1960 was, and still remains, a diverse 
country consisting of over 250 ethnic groups (Osaghae 18). Although not true in all cases, 
divisions among Nigeria’s ethnic groups were often reinforced by geographical divisions 
(Muslims generally live in the North, while Christians live in the South), religious 
divisions (Nigeria is split nearly evenly between Islam and Christianity with a majority of 
the Hausa-Fulani practicing Islam and a majority of Igbos practicing Christianity), socio-
economic divisions and political inequality (Osaghae 18). Due to these reinforcing 
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divisions, ethnic, religious, and regional tensions persisted after gaining independence 
among Nigeria’s three dominant ethnic groups: the Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the North, 
the Christian Igbo in the East, and the religiously mixed Yoruba in the West. Akinwumi 
writes that the previous British colonial policies and the practices of British colonial 
officers contributed to regional tensions post-independence as Britain was biased toward 
development of the south. For example, when Nigeria became a British protectorate in 
1900, the British divided the country geographically into Northern and Southern 
protectorates which served to reinforce geographical, religious, and ethnic divisions 
(Akinwumi 21). When Britain initiated a policy of amalgamation in 1914, many British 
officers fought unification and British colonialism established practices that contributed 
to inequality between Northern and Southern Nigeria. For example, Akinwumi writes 
that Fredrick Lugard, the Commissioner of the Northern protectorate, wanted to “prevent 
Northern provinces from being polluted by Southern educated elite” and thus failed to 
fully implement unification of the two regions (31). Lugard made an agreement with 
Northern Muslim leaders to shield Northern Nigeria from Western influences, including 
educational systems. As a result, Southern Nigeria’s education system flourished sooner 
and more quickly than that of the North, and by 1912 there were only 34 primary schools 
in Northern Nigeria while there were 150 primary and ten secondary schools in the South 
(Osaghae 5). Moreover, British officers in the North protectorate were especially against 
unification, believing that the regions were separate entities, and many, such as 
Lieutenant Governor Richmond Palmer, refused to apply laws passed by the Southern-
based Nigerian Legislative Council to the North despite official unification (Akinwumi 
34). For example, governors in the Northern protectorate settled Southern, Christian 
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Nigerians apart from the indigenous Muslim Nigerians in the North (Osaghae 5). 
Akinwumi believes this antagonism between British colonial officers reinforced existing 
ethnic divisions and partly laid the foundation for future regional conflict among 
Nigerians post-independence (35).  
It was with this divisive history that Nigeria entered into independence in 1960. In 
1959 Nigerians had approved the First Republic’s constitution which divided Nigeria into 
three states and set up a parliamentary system of government with a judicial, a bi-cameral 
legislative, and an executive branch (Falola 95).  The same year Nigeria held a general 
election in which three major political parties were elected into office: the Action Group 
(AG) from the West, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), and the National Council of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) from the Southeast, none having an overall majority 
of votes (Akinwumi 48).  In order to achieve an overall majority, the NPC and the NCNC 
formed a political alliance in which the NPC’s deputy leader would become prime 
minister and the NCNC’s leader would become the governor general (and later president) 
when Nigeria became a republic in 1963 (Akinwumi 48). Despite opposition from the 
NCNC, which wished to share in the spoils of electoral victory, the NPC actively 
promoted Northern interests (Akinwumi 58). Notably, the NPC appointed Northern 
Nigerians to federal positions and ensured that most of the developments contained in the 
1962 – 1968 development plan were located in the North (Akinwumi 58). Falola writes 
“Politics [of this era] involved primarily the ability to gain control of public resources, or 
the process of doing this, not for public ends, but for private ends” (108). The politicians 
elected to office viewed their position as an opportunity to consolidate power by 
funneling as many resources to their regional electoral bases as possible. Thus “[c]hanges 
52 
 
in government were interpreted as changes in fortunes” for Nigerians (Falola 109). The 
preferential appointment of Northern officials to government posts and disproportionate 
allocation of funds to the North by Northern Nigerian parties only reinforced existing 
geographical, religious, ethnic, and cultural divides (Osaghae 38 - 39). Two political 
parties, Nigerian National Alliance and the United Progressive Grand Alliance, contested 
the 1964 elections due to widespread vote rigging and election fraud (Falola 105). As a 
result Nigeria held new elections in 1965. By the time the 1965 elections were declared 
fraudulent as well, the government had lost popular support and widespread violence 
broke out, resulting in a military coup by Igbo officers of the Nigerian military on 15 
January 1966 (Osaghae 56).  
After the coup, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi assumed control of the military 
regime, becoming the first military head of state (Osaghae 57, 59). From 1951 until the 
Ironsi’s coup in 1966, Northern military officers and politicians had been at helm of 
Nigeria’s political processes (Ojeleye 41). Aguiyi-Ironsi attempted to unify Nigeria by 
issuing the Unification Decree on 24 May 1966 which created a unitary republic of 
provinces and abolished the federal structure (Osaghae 59). Northern Nigerians, who 
viewed federalism as a means to protect regional differences, opposed the decree 
(Osaghae 60). Backlash against the Unification Decree, resulted in multiple attacks on 
civilian Igbos between May and September 1966. In three separate attacks during this 
time frame, soldiers and civilians killed between 5,000 and 50,000 Igbos, offering a 
glimpse of what was to come in the Biafran civil war (Kelly 44).  Additionally, Northern 
officers were still bitter over the murder of Northern officers by Igbo officers during the 
coup which brought Ironsi to power (Ojeleye 41).  This bitterness, coupled with Northern 
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officers’ belief that Igbo officers were marginalizing Northerners from the political 
process, resulted in a counter-coup, led mostly by Northern army officers, which ended 
Ironsi’s rule on 29 July 1966 (Falola 118 – 119, Osaghae 60).  
Due to the violence against Northern officers by Igbo officers during Ironsi’s 
coup, many Northern officers distrusted the Igbo officers. Subsequently, many Igbo 
officers lost their lives during the coup (Ojeleye 42). Traditionally, Ironsi’s replacement 
should have been the most senior member of the military regime, in this case a Yoruba 
general (Ojeleye 43). However, General Gowon, a Northerner, was appointed as head of 
the new regime. The violence against Igbo officers and the appointment of a Northern 
general as head of the regime were unacceptable to many Eastern military leaders. In 
response, in April 1967, the Eastern region began to withhold customs and other revenue 
from the federal military regime in opposition to the Northern-led coup (Burns 312). One 
month later, in May 1967, the Eastern region’s general assembly ordered the region’s 
military governor, Colonel Ojukwu, to declare the Eastern region independent. On 30 
May 1967, Colonel Ojukwu made the official declaration to secede (Burns 312).  
The Igbo declaration of independence for Eastern Nigeria launched the Nigerian 
Biafran civil war to create a state of Biafra, during which one to three million Nigerians 
lost their lives (Falola and Heaton 180). General Gowon responded by proclaiming 
Ojukwu’s declaration of independence an act of treason, instituting a state of emergency 
for all of Nigeria, and eventually ordering a blockade of the Eastern region (Ojeleye 45; 
Burns 312). Gowon’s declaration of a state of emergency created 12 new states to replace 
the North, West, and East regions (Osaghae 65). At the time, the Biafran army was 
estimated to be approximately 25,000 troops, mostly youths and hurriedly organized and 
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trained in makeshift camps while the federal army was an estimated 40,000 troops 
(Uwechue 7). However, on 6 July 1967, when federal military forces and Eastern 
region’s forces clashed for the first time, Biafran forces pushed back federal forces as 
they entered into the Eastern region (Ojeleye 45). Soon after Biafran forces overran the 
Mid-West state in a lightning operation on 9 August 1967 (Uwechue 8). By the next day, 
Biafran forces controlled the city of Benin but lost the city to federal troops in September 
1967 (Burns 312). Throughout September Biafran forces were swept out of the Mid-West 
region by federal troops and by May 1968 Biafra was completely blockaded (Uwechue 
9). From the beginning of the war until December 1969 several attempts at peace talks 
collapsed (Uwechue 9 – 10). However, the stalemate ended in January 1970 when federal 
troops took control of Owerri, the only major town still under Biafran control (Uwechue 
10). Anticipating defeat, Colonel Ojukwu fled the country, and on 15 January his 
successor, Colonel Effiong, surrendered to the federal military effectively ending the 
Biafran civil war (Burns 313).  
The civil war exacted a devastating humanitarian toll. By early 1968 the death toll 
estimates for Biafra ranged from 200 to 6,000 per day (Kelly 46). Gowon’s regime had 
not only changed the Nigerian currency after the start of the war, effectively preventing 
the Biafran government from purchasing food, but successfully blockaded both the 
Biafran coast and land borders and prevented humanitarian aircraft from using Nigerian 
airspace to fly in supplies (Kelly 46; Falola and Heaton 176). As a result, millions of 
Biafran civilians suffered from malnutrition and/or starved to death during the war. By 
the end of the war, three million Nigerians had perished (Kelly 46). The civil war 
strengthened existing regional, religious, and ethnic divisions. Colonial-era divisions 
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between Eastern and Northern Nigerians were more deeply entrenched by the coups and 
subsequent war while Igbo/Yoruba divisions were reinforced due to the Yoruban support 
of the Northern-led federal military regime during the war (Osaghae 67-68).   
The Biafran civil war also had a significant impact on Nigeria’s foreign relations. 
In 1960 Nigeria’s foreign minister expressed a desire for Nigeria to have closer relations 
with Western states, despite Nigeria’s official policy of non-alignment and primary focus 
on the elimination of racism and colonization of Africa (Uhakheme 10-11; Mbachu 76). 
Whether from a desire to have greater influence in international politics or because 
Nigeria received $273 million in foreign aid from Western states between 1960 and 1966, 
Nigeria often supported Western positions (Uhakheme 10). Although in 1960, Nigeria 
spoke out against blocking Communist China from joining the United Nations, exercising 
its non-alignment policy (Chibundu 5-6). Western states assisted Nigeria in creating its 
National Development Plan in the early 1960’s, signaling Nigeria’s strong foreign 
relations with the West (Mbachu 76). At this time most of Nigeria’s economic 
partnerships were with the Western bloc, with only 6% of its imports coming from the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China, and Eastern Europe combined 
(Mbachu 92). However, in 1967, shortly before the outbreak of the Biafran civil war, 
General Gowon exerted Nigeria’s independence from Western policies in the 
international community and actively pursued relations with the USSR which was 
looking to establish a foothold in West Africa (Uwechue 9). General Gowon’s regime 
received MIG-17s and 122 mm artillery batteries from the USSR (Uhakheme 12). 
Gowon’s regime also oversaw the establishment of foreign relations with China in 1971, 
when Nigeria formally acknowledged the People’s Republic of China as the official 
56 
 
Chinese government in lieu of the Republic of China (Chibundu 12).
10
 Nigeria 
culminated this recognition with a formal state visit by Gowon to China in 1974 
(Chibundu 12). 
The civil war was a major concern for the international community. Despite 
USSR involvement, General Gowon and the federal military received support from Great 
Britain, which wished to retain influence in its former colony (Uwechue 9). Several 
countries supported the Biafran cause with humanitarian and military aid allowing 
Colonel Ojukwu and the Biafran forces to fight for 30 months (Osaghae 66). Notably, 
France officially announced its support of the Biafran forces in 1968, reportedly due to 
publicized accounts of the atrocities in Biafra (“France Voices”). However, France may 
also have been motivated by two of its former colonies, Gabon and Ivory Coast, 
supporting the Biafran cause or possibly by hopes of securing access to oil supplies. In 
display of its support, France provided 300 tons of arms per week during September and 
October 1968 and secretly sold two B-26 bombers to Biafran forces (Osaghae 66; 
Uwechue 8). Colonel Ojukwu wrote to the Italian prime minister and the Pope expressing 
his concern of Italy’s arms sales, which provided Northern Muslims with weapons to kill 
Catholic Igbos. As a result, Biafra won Italy’s support in the war and the federal troops 
lost some of their arms supply (Osaghae 66). Several non-governmental agencies, 
including the Red Cross, Oxfam, and Caritas, had pro-Biafra sympathies and actively 
campaigned internationally to rally support for Biafra (Osaghae 66).  
                                                 
10
 In 1949 the Chinese Communist Party founded the People’s Republic of China (PROC) in mainland 
China. The opposing party, the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) relocated to Taipei, Taiwan where 
it formed the Republic of China (ROC). The PROC and ROC each adhere to a “one China” policy which 
states that mainland China and Taiwan are one country. Both the PROC and ROC claim to be the sole 
legitimate government of China. Countries wishing to have diplomatic relations with the PROC must 
recognize the PROC as the only legitimate government of China (“One-China Principle”). 
57 
 
After the war oil played an important role in the policies of Gowon’s regime, as it 
provided the revenue for the regime’s developmental plans. Oil had first been discovered 
in Nigeria in the Delta region in 1956 by the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company 
of Nigeria Limited (“Oil and Gas”). Then in 1960 other foreign companies were 
permitted exploration rights in the Delta. In the 1970’s oil became an increasingly 
important means of national income. During the war, the importance of Nigeria’s oil 
industry grew as did the association between oil industry control and power. As oil prices 
soared in the 1970’s the Gowon regime continued to benefit from increased revenues and 
became more actively involved in the oil industry. Due to increased oil revenue, Gowon’s 
regime was able to achieve budget surpluses from 1970 – 1975, allowing the regime to 
afford the Second National Development Plan (1970 – 1974) which restored educational, 
agricultural, industrial, and travel infrastructure damaged during the civil war (Falola 
139). Gowon announced that once his regime had achieved the goals of its reform 
program (which included eliminating corruption, approving a new constitution, creating 
new states, holding a new census, establishing new political parties, and reorganizing the 
army and civil service) he would relinquish power to a democratic government (Falola 
146-7). However, in October 1974 Gowon announced the transition would be delayed as 
he claimed that withdrawing from power in 1976 as planned would create further 
instability and confusion (Akinwumi 97). Capitalizing on public disapproval of Gowon’s 
delay, a group of military officers successfully overthrew Gowon’s regime in a bloodless 
coup that brought Lieutenant-General Murtala Mohammed to power on 29 July 1975 
(Osaghae 79).  
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Once in power Mohammed reversed many of Gowon’s international and domestic 
policies. Diplomatically, Mohammed transitioned Nigeria’s foreign policy back toward 
non-alignment and focused on supporting liberation movements in Africa, notably ending 
apartheid in South Africa (Uhakheme 12). Despite the shift away from pursuing a closer 
relationship with the USSR, Nigerian-U.S. relations were strained between 1975 and 
1976. During this time the US had no active Nigerian policy while Nigeria was focused 
on increasing self-reliance of African states (Uhakheme 13; Mbachu 61-2). Adding to the 
strain was Nigeria’s disapproval of the Americans’ covert armament of the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) faction which was fighting against 
the Nigerian-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) faction 
in the Angolan civil war (Uhakheme 13, 15, 21). Domestically, Mohammed worked 
quickly to enact government reform and address corruption. Mohammed removed over 
11,000 government officials from military and civilian service, promoted and appointed 
new officials to governmental positions, and required all government officials (current 
and retired) to be transparent in their finances (Falola 152, 154). In 1975 the Mohammed 
regime instigated a five-stage, four-year transition plan which included the creation of a 
Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) to determine a new democratic system of 
government for Nigeria (Akinwumi 72-3).  However, less than a year after Mohammed 
assumed power, an unsuccessful coup resulted in the death of Lieutenant-General 
Mohammed and brought Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo to power as head of 
government (Osaghae 79).  
Lieutenant-General Obasanjo continued Mohammed’s anti-corruption and 
government reform policies. Specifically, he continued Mohammed’s purge of military 
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government officials by enforcing compulsory retirement and installing new military 
governors. The purge carried over to include civil servants. Mohammed and Obasanjo 
removed over 11,000 civil servants, including police and judges, for malfeance or 
ineptitude (Falola and Heaton 189). However, while government and military officials 
were replaced, the overall system remained largely unchanged. One significant 
improvement was the elimination of Nigeria’s ban on politics, which Obasanjo lifted on 
21 September 1978 (Falola 151, 162). Also, Obasanjo continued Mohammed’s foreign 
policy of non-alignment, international cooperation for peace, total unity of Africa, and 
support of African liberation movements, by peaceful means if possible but by arming 
liberation forces if necessary (Uhakheme 20; Mbachu 63). Large Western involvement in 
Nigeria’s oil industry, successful diplomatic exchanges in 1977 and 1978, and increased 
US trade and investment in Nigeria ($1.49 billion and $3.5 billion respectively) all helped 
to improve Nigeria-U.S. relations (Uhakheme 12-3). Moreover, by 1979 the United 
States received 18.8% of its oil from Nigeria while the American-owned Gulf Oil 
Corporation received 60% of its total oil from Nigeria (Uhakheme 27-8). Nigeria desired 
American support of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, but, aware of its 
significance as a key American oil supplier, was not hesitant to engage in confrontation 
to acquire support of its pro-liberation policies in Africa. To prove its point, Nigeria 
disqualified British oil companies from seeking licenses and contracts in Nigeria over a 
disagreement with British policy toward Rhodesia (Uhakheme 30). Nigeria threatened an 
oil embargo against the United States if the US lifted sanctions on Rhodesia, but never 
had to carry the threat out as the United States left the sanctions in place (Mbachu 81). 
According to Uhakheme, the U.S. saw Africa in terms of the East/West conflict and 
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failed to recognize the unique dynamics of African struggles, consistently opposing 
armed conflict in rhetoric but covertly backing the anti-Russia side in conflicts (20). The 
US viewed Nigeria as a state with increasing continental influence and thus a potential 
counter to Cuban and Russian involvement in Africa and promoter of American foreign 
policy in Africa overall (Uhakheme 14). Although both countries had a common 
objective of promoting freedom in Africa (the Carter administration favored ending 
apartheid in South Africa), Nigeria maintained an Africentric policy of promoting 
decolonization and freedom while the United States’ policy was motivated by the 
East/West conflict and access to oil supplies (Uhakheme 14, 29; Mbachu 81). 
The two oil booms of the 1970’s provided as much as 80% of Nigeria’s budget 
revenues (Akinwumi 122). Although the early to mid-1970’s were a prosperous time for 
the Nigerian oil industry, the oil boom busted in 1978 resulting in a nearly 30% decrease 
in oil production and turned a budget surplus into a deficit (Osaghae 99; Falola 158). The 
deficit resulted in the Obasanjo regime enacting laws to increase and control oil revenue. 
For example, in 1977 the Nigerian government created the Land Use Act which declared 
that governors would control all state land and thus all petroleum reserves (“Oil and 
Gas”). However, the regime failed to reduce Nigeria’s economic dependency on oil 
exports, and subsequently the new civilian government inherited a huge budget deficit, 
escalating debt, growing inflation, and an unbalanced economy overly dependent on the 
petroleum industry (Osaghae 156-157). 
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1979 – 1993: The Second Republic, Military Rule, and the 1993 Elections 
 For the first time in Nigerian history, a military regime initiated a democratic 
transition. Lt. Gen. Obasanjo’s regime successfully oversaw the return to civilian rule in 
1979 when elections were held during the months of July and August (Osaghae 95). For 
the Second Republic, Nigeria modeled its new government after the American 
presidential system and elected the president and legislature in a national election. The 
bicameral legislative body consisted of a Senate and House of Representatives 
(Akinwumi 73). The president appointed the head of an independent judiciary which 
required Senate confirmation. Once elections were held, the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN), a Northern Muslim party, won the presidency and, with over 30% of the vote, the 
most seats in the legislature (Akinwumi 79). On 1 October 1979, NPN candidate Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari took the oath of office and assumed the presidency (Osaghae 95).  
Unfortunately, the government failed to work across party lines and address 
Nigeria’s problems. Falola writes that Nigerian politicians primarily focused on 
achieving and securing power to serve their own self-interests. As a result, the Second 
Republic was marked by rampant corruption, a failure to achieve any of the goals the 
government set out, and complete dysfunction (Falola 174). On 31 December 1983, amid 
great social unrest and widespread disapproval of the civilian government, Major General 
Muhammadu Buhari led a coup and overthrew the civilian government, effectively 
ending Second Republic (Akinwumi 87). Like previous coups, the new military regime 
promised to restore national unity, improve the standard of living for Nigerians, and, 
highest on the list, remove corruption from politics by “housecleaning” the government 
(Falola 180-1). However, Buhari’s regime lost popular support and moved away from 
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democracy by issuing decrees which proclaimed military decrees supreme over civilian 
statutes and eroded freedom of the press (Akinwumi 100). This authoritarianism 
combined with the regime’s failure to reverse Nigeria’s economic decline and failure to 
develop an actionable transition plan for a return to a civilian democratic government 
provided General Ibrahim Babangida a springboard to launch another coup on 27 August 
1985 (Osaghae 189).  
Yet, Babangida’s policies also failed to improve Nigeria’s worsening economy or 
decrease violence. One of Babangida’s most unsuccessful policies was his institution of 
the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986, an austerity plan designed to promote 
economic growth in Nigeria’s economy (Osaghae 198 - 199). Babangida hoped to receive 
a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help reduce and restructure 
Nigeria’s debt. However, the IMF required Nigeria to implement economic reforms to 
receive a loan. In an effort to acquire the IMF loan but appear independent of the IMF 
and Western influence, Babangida allowed Nigerians to vote on whether to execute the 
IMF’s suggested economic reforms or develop its own economic reforms plan. Nigerians 
voted to implement their own reform program, the SAP, which still opened the doors to 
receiving an IMF loan and future debt restructuring (Falola and Heaton 217).  
Unfortunately, the SAP completely failed to stimulate the Nigerian economy. 
From 1986 - 1988 external debt increased from $15 billion to $23.45 billion and the naira 
devalued, resulting in lower standard of living for many lower and middle class Nigerians 
(Falola 185). Nigeria’s worsening economic situation also precluded Nigeria from 
actively aiding other African states and assisting liberation forces, as Babangida wished 
to do (Mbachu 84). Because of Nigeria’s financial crisis, Babangida’s foreign policy 
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focused on economic issues, such as increasing trade, attracting foreign investment, and 
reducing Nigeria’s debt (Jega 5). In this vein, Babangida visited China in 1985, resulting 
in a purchase of arms and ammunition by Nigeria (Chibundu 13). This visit set the stage 
for subsequent exchanges and a deepening economic relationship with China, a 
relationship that further blossomed in creation of the Nigeria-China Joint Commission, 
which is responsible for developing economic cooperation between the two countries 
(Chibundu 19).  
Perhaps Babangida’s second significant policy failure was his decision for Nigeria 
to join the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an organization that promoted 
values and governance based on Islam. This decision escalated existing tensions between 
Muslim and Christian Nigerians. Christians viewed Nigeria’s membership in the OIC as 
an attempt by Babangida to win support from Muslims to reinforce his political power 
and encroach on their rights and were concerned OIC membership would lead to impose 
Islam on all Nigerians (Akinwumi 142-3). Babangida tried to ease tensions by reversing 
the decision to join the OIC, but from 1986 to 1992 nine riots occurred between 
Christians and Muslims, resulting in over 2,000 deaths (Falola and Heaton 222-3).  
Babangida’s transition program was also fraught with failure and setbacks. From 
the beginning of his rule General Babangida claimed to be working towards a transition 
to civilian rule. In January 1986, just months after assuming his role as head of state, 
Babangida created a political bureau which drafted the Transition to Civilian Rule Decree 
19 of 1987 outlining a plan to transition to a democratically elected civilian government 
(Osaghae 212 - 214). Akinwumi argues that Babangida’s elaborate bureaucratization of 
the transition process (he created three bureaucracies in charge of the transition: the 
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National Electoral Commission, the Directorate of Social Mobilisation, and the Center 
for Democratic Studies) was a strategy to perpetuate his power by causing confusion 
(101). In fact, Babangida’s regime tightly controlled the transition to civilian rule. The 
regime criticized civilian leaders, created the only two political parties allowed to form, 
the Social Democratic Party and the National Republican Party, and determined which 
politicians could participate in the process (Falola 189). While Babangida lifted the ban 
on political parties in 1989 and the ban on political participation by former politicians and 
government officials in 1992, he postponed national elections three times to change the 
transition procedures as he deemed necessary (Falola and Heaton 225). Finally, in 1993, 
Babaginda’s regime approved two candidates to run for president. Chief M.K.O Abiola 
and Bashir Tofa, both Muslim, ran for president in a national election on 12 June 1993. 
(Falola and Heaton 227). The election was largely considered to be free and fair, but 
ultimately failed to usher in a democratically elected government when Babangida 
annulled the results eleven days later. The annulment caused widespread unrest which 
forced Babangida to hand power over to an Interim National Government (ING), led by 
Ernest Shonekan, which ruled intermediately (Akinwumi 105). However, in November 
1993 the Lagos High Court declared the ING illegal. This decision provided the 
opportunity for General Sani Abacha to seize power in a military coup, effectively ending 
the aborted Third Republic (Falola and Heaton 229). 
Process Tracing: 1993 – 2010 
This section seeks to determine which factors most impacted Nigeria’s Freedom 
House scores between 1993 and 2010. As a general trend, Nigeria’s scores started out 
extremely low in 1993 and gradually improved from 1998 until 2010. While this analysis 
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bears a similar chronological structure to the above history section, more emphasis and 
focus is paid to the events which have most affected Nigeria’s political and civil liberties 
and subsequently, its Freedom House scores. Overall, domestic political policies, ethnic 
and religious tensions, and violent regional clashes over petroleum exploitation had the 
strongest impact on Nigeria’s Freedom House scores. However, multinational petroleum 
corporations, especially Shell, also affected political and civil liberties in Nigeria by 
exploiting oil resources, often resulting in violent clashes between regional and ethnic 
groups and the government over the subsequent environmental degradation and unequal 
distribution of oil revenue. Additionally, foreign countries, such as the United States and 
Britain, impacted civil and political rights in Nigeria by exerting diplomatic and 
economic pressure on military regimes to return to civilian rule and reinstitute 
democracy. However, the overall impact of such pressure remained minimal as the 
United States and other major oil importers never used the strongest tool at their disposal, 
an embargo on Nigerian petroleum exports. 
1993 –1998: Abacha’s Military Dictatorship 
During Abacha’s rule (1993 – 1998) Nigeria’s Freedom House political rights 
score remained a seven, the lowest possible score.  Above all else, the low score was a 
direct result of the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections and of several of the 
policies of Sani Abacha’s subsequent military dictatorship. The 1993 elections were 
widely considered Nigeria’s freest, fairest, and most peaceful to date (Falola and Heaton 
227). By itself, Babangida’s annulment of the election would likely have been enough to 
result in a Freedom House political rights score of seven, but it was Abacha’s military 
coup, arrest of widely accepted presidential election winner M.K.O Abiola, and despotic 
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rule until 1998 that eroded political rights in Nigeria and kept the country’s political 
rights score at a seven for five years. By itself Abacha’s military dictatorship negatively 
impacted Nigeria’s political rights score as it undermined the results of a free and fair 
election, eliminated Nigerians’ political choices, prevented elected officials from 
determining national policies, and was unaccountable to the Nigerian people. Several of 
Abacha’s policies negatively impacted Nigeria’s Freedom House political rights score, 
but two of the most significant factors were his complete control of the political process 
and his violent prohibition of any political opposition. 
Political Rights During Abacha’s Rule 
Upon assuming office, Abacha took measures to retain complete control over 
political processes, including any democratic transition plans, severely degrading 
political rights in Nigeria and consequently Nigeria’s Freedom House political rights 
score. One of Abacha’s first undertakings after seizing power was to remove all civilians 
from government positions and ban all political parties and activities (Falola and Heaton 
230). By September 1994, Abacha announced he had eliminated all civilians from his 
eleven-member ruling council and expanded the council to twenty-five members, mostly 
military officers, with two civilian observers (“Military Ruler”). Moreover, Abacha 
dissolved all elected government bodies, including state and national assemblies (Falola 
and Heaton 230). When political parties were allowed to form again in 1994, only the 
five political parties which nominated Abacha as their presidential nominee and which 
were secretly sponsored by Abacha were allowed to officially register (Akinwumi 106, 
Falola and Heaton 233). Although Abacha officially lifted the ban on political activity in 
1995, the Transition to Civil Rule Decree 1 of 1996 declared all accusations, 
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misrepresentations, and distortions of the transition program illegal, facilitating arrests of 
political opponents (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1997”). Abacha’s regime also 
controlled elections held at all levels. The 1996 and 1997 Human Rights Watch World 
Reports note that the local government elections held in March 1996 were fraudulent, as 
they were conducted on a “zero party” basis and extremely compromised by executive 
interference. Moreover, the candidates in the March 1997 local elections were screened 
by the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria, the State Security Service, and the 
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency to ensure no candidate had connections to pro-
democracy, human rights or opposition groups. Similarly, candidates were screened in 
the same manner for the December 1997 state assembly elections (“Human Rights Watch 
World Report 1999”).  
In order to retain such rigid political control, Abacha quickly, and often violently, 
suppressed all political opposition, significantly degrading political rights in Nigeria and 
negatively impacting Nigeria’s Freedom House political rights score. Soon after seizing 
power in 1993, Abacha created the State Secret Security Service and the Presidential 
Strike Force, both designed to seek out and eliminate political opponents either through 
arrests or in some cases assassination (Akinwumi 105). Notably, Abacha charged 1993 
presidential election winner Moshood Abiola with treason for proclaiming himself as 
rightful leader of Nigeria. In June 1994 Abacha’s regime arrested Abiola and held him in 
isolation, resulting in widespread riots for his release. A couple of months later Abacha 
offered Abiola release, but on the condition that Abiola not speak with the press or 
participate in political activities. Abiola declined the offer and spent four more years in 
prison (“Nigeria Finds”). Furthermore, Abacha’s regime harassed Abiola’s wife, Kudirat 
68 
 
Abiola, for participating in anti-government activities and criticizing the military 
(“Wife”). In 1996 Kudirat Abiola was shot and killed by an unidentified gunman, widely 
believed to have been acting on behalf of the military regime (Jukwey).  
The execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa is perhaps the most infamous example of 
Abacha’s violent suppression of political opponents. Saro-Wiwa, a well-known Nigerian 
playwright and author, had strongly criticized the Abacha regime for environmental 
damage by oil companies in the Delta region and actively campaigned for a greater share 
of oil revenue to be distributed to oil producing regions (French, “Nigeria Executes”). In 
1994 Abacha arrested Saro-Wiwa along with eight others, known as the Ogoni Nine, for 
the murder of four pro-military Ogoni leaders (French, “Nigeria Executes”). Although 
widely believed to be innocent of the charges, Saro-Wiwa was held for a year in a 
military camp while often denied access to legal counsel and outside visitation (French, 
“Nigeria Executes”). Despite international pressure from the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Organization for African Unity, and the United Nations Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Abacha’s regime hanged the Ogoni Nine on 10 November 1995 
(“Human Rights Watch World Report 1996”). Ken Saro-Wiwa’s arrest and execution 
highlighted Abacha’s disregard for political freedoms and his intent on silencing political 
opposition and dissent.  
Many other political opponents were also arrested for their criticisms of the 
military regime. Abacha arrested over 50 alleged coup plotters, including former head of 
state General Olusegun Obasanjo, Major-General Musa Yar’Adua, and several leaders of 
human rights and pro-democracy groups such as  Democratic Alternative, the Civil 
Liberties Organization, and the National Democratic Coalition (“Human Rights Watch 
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World Report 1996”). According to Human Rights Watch World Reports on Nigeria for 
1996, 1997, and 1998, arrests and harassment of regime critics, pro-democracy leaders, 
and human rights advocates until the end of Abacha’s rule in 1998.  
Civil Liberties During Abacha’s Regime 
Abacha’s regard for civil liberties was dismal. During his rule, Nigeria’s civil 
liberties score fell from a five in 1993 to a seven in 1995 and rose only minimally to a six 
in 1996 and 1997. While Abacha’s power seizure further eroded the rule of law, three of 
Abacha’s gravest abuses of civil liberties were his suppression of freedom of the press, 
his suppression of freedom to assemble (especially concerning non-governmental 
organizations and labor unions), and his regime’s failure to protect women and children’s 
rights, notably by failing to prevent drug and human trafficking. 
Abacha prohibited any criticism of the military regime by the Nigerian press. 
Shortly after assuming power, in September 1993, Abacha issued a decree which 
effectively shut down three Nigerian newspapers (“Human Rights Watch World Report 
1995”). The military regime harassed and arrested many journalists and shut down 
newspapers for publishing articles critical of the regime. For example, in 1995 The New 
York Times reported that security agents confiscated an edition of the Nigerian news 
magazine Tell in order to prevent its publication of an article critical of Abacha, raided 
the homes of two editors, and arrested Tell’s editor-in-chief (“Nigerian Journal”). 
According to Human Rights Watch, at least two other editors-in-chief were also arrested 
and sentenced to life in prison for printing anti-regime articles, although their sentences 
were later commuted to fifteen years in prison (“Human Rights Watch World Report 
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1996”). Arrests continued until 1998 and included members of the foreign press as well 
(“Human Rights Watch World Report 1997-1999”). Often violence was involved in the 
arrests. Notably, in 1997, Oni Egbunine, editor of The Horn, was arrested and beaten into 
a coma. Then in 1998, a journalist was shot and killed by Nigerian police when they 
arrived to arrest the newspaper printer (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 – 
1999”). 
Under Abacha Nigerians’ freedom to assemble was gravely diminished. In June 
1995 a Democratic Alternative meeting was broken up by Abacha’s State Security 
Service (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1996”). Activities and meetings of human 
rights groups and labor unions, including the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), 
and Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) were 
disrupted and leaders harassed and sometimes killed (“Human Rights Watch World 
Report 1997 – 1998”). In 1998, Nigerian police shot and killed five Muslims protesting 
the arrest of Sheikh El Zak-Zaky, a Northern Shiite Muslim leader (“Human Rights 
Watch World Report 1998”). 
Additionally, violations of women and children’s rights during Abacha’s regime 
also negatively impacted Nigeria’s civil liberties score. Human trafficking posed a 
significant problem for women and children. A 1997 New York Times article noted that 
Nigeria was a stop for child slaves during their transport to Central Africa (“Slave 
Trade”). However, according to the article, many children would remain in Nigeria where 
it was common-place for them to be sold as household servants or as prostitutes. Human 
Rights Watch World Report 1999 observed that by the end of Abacha’s rule in 1998 child 
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labor, often completely unpaid, and child marriages, were common practice in Nigeria. 
The report also reveals that martial rape and physical abuse that did not cause “grievous 
hurt” of wives remained legal throughout Abacha’s dictatorship. Moreover, the report 
claims 60% of Nigerian women experienced female genital mutilation (FGM). Abacha’s 
regime publically condemned FGM, but made no attempts to eradicate the practice 
(“Nigerian Human Rights Practices”). Child marriages and the tradition of FGM in 
Nigeria were, and continue to be, founded upon cultural customs and values, and both 
issues were prevalent before Abacha assumed power. While Abacha’s dictatorship may 
not have exacerbated these issues, its unwillingness to proactively abolish FGM and 
enforce laws prohibiting child marriage contributed to Nigeria’s poor civil liberties 
ranking. 
Effect of Nigeria’s Oil Industry on Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
Nigeria’s oil industry played a role in two of the factors which impacted Nigeria’s 
Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores. Notably, much of the political 
opposition to Abacha was over the regime’s oil policies, specifically revenue distribution. 
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, 
opposed the Abacha regime over its cooperation with oil companies, such as Shell, which 
degraded the Delta’s environment and destroyed the region’s waters used by local 
fishermen (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1996”). MOSOP also opposed Abacha’s 
policies regarding oil revenue distribution, which stipulated the Delta region would 
receive only three percent of oil income (later to be increased to thirteen percent). 
MOSOP contended that oil producing regions in the South should receive more than what 
was allocated by the government’s plan (Lewis, “Blood and Oil”). As noted earlier, Saro-
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Wiwa and several other Ogoni activists were later executed by Abacha’s regime for 
charges widely believed to be fraudulent. 
Abacha’s regime often denied labor unions the right to assemble and, as a result 
of ongoing strikes, dissolved some labor unions completely, notably those unions 
involved in the oil industry. One example is the oil industry strike in July 1994. After a 
month of strikes by oil workers, who were angry over the incarceration of M. K. O. 
Abiola (a Southerner), earnings from Nigeria’s oil exports were diminished enough to 
motivate Abacha to offer Abiola’s release in return for an end to the strikes (French, “In 
Nigeria”). However, Abiola’s release was to be on the condition that he would not speak 
to the press or participate in politics. The oil unions rejected the offer and strikes 
continued, diminishing oil output by twenty percent (French, “In Nigeria”). As a result, 
Abiola dissolved the labor unions and ordered the workers to return to work (“Nigeria 
Judge”). From that point on, labor unions were run by government-appointed heads and 
arrests of union leaders continued throughout 1995 (“Human Rights Watch World Report 
1996”). As noted earlier, leaders of NUPENG, an oil industry labor union, including its 
Secretary General Frank Kokori, remained incarcerated through Abacha’s rule (“Human 
Rights Watch World Report 1998”).  
Often Abacha acted at the bequest of or in cooperation with oil companies, 
notably Shell, which produced nearly half of Nigeria’s crude oil by the end of 1995 
(“Five Companies”). According to a New York Times article, Shell appealed to the 
Nigeria government in 1992 for protection of its operations from vandalism, but was 
forced to withdraw temporarily from Nigeria in 1993 due to security concerns (Lewis, 
“Blood and Oil”). Lewis claims that Nigerian military documents show that a year later 
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in 1994, Abacha deployed military troops to the region in hopes of ending the attacks and 
stabilizing the area to entice Shell to return (Lewis, “Blood and Oil”). Shell did return to 
oil production by 1995, announcing new construction of an oil pipeline through the Delta 
region, despite the International Finance Corporation pulling out of the project over the 
execution of the Ogoni Nine (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1996”). Shell was 
criticized for not intervening for clemency on Ken Saro-Wiwa’s behalf. While Shell 
retracted initial press statements accusing Saro-Wiwa of violent tactics, the company 
stated it was “not for commercial organizations like Shell to interfere in the legal process 
of a sovereign state such as Nigeria” (Lewis, “Blood and Oil”). Other oil companies also 
cooperated with the Abacha regime. Elf and Agip were involved in joint ventures with 
Shell and the Nigerian governments as well (“Human Rights Watch World Report 
1996”). Notably, in May 1998, 200 Nigerian youths attacked one of its offshore oil 
platforms, Chevron transported Nigerian troops out to the platform to regain control. The 
troops killed two youths and injured one in the process of taking over the platform 
(“Human Rights Watch World Report 1999”).  
US Foreign Policy Toward Nigeria During Abacha’s Rule 
The United States took diplomatic and economic measures to promote democracy 
and human rights in Nigeria during this period. When the 1993 elections were cancelled, 
the United States suspended all foreign aid except for aid channeled through 
nongovernmental organizations, selectively approved military arms sales on a case-by-
case basis, and expelled the Nigerian military attaché from the US (“Human Rights 
Watch World Report 1994”). In 1994, President Clinton sent Reverend Jesse Jackson to 
Nigeria as part of a diplomatic attempt to urge General Abacha to hand over power and 
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release former presidential candidate, M.K.O. Abiola (Noble). Ultimately, Jackson’s 
diplomacy attempts were unsuccessful and in 1995 the Clinton administration threatened 
to continue economic actions, but never seriously considered an oil embargo. The US 
also recalled the American ambassador from Lagos and banned all military arms sales 
over opposition to the continued detention of political prisoners and the Ogoni Nine’s 
death sentence (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1996”).  
At first, American economic and diplomatic pressure appeared to have minor 
success. In August 1995 Clinton urged Abacha to grant clemency to forty political 
prisoners and commute Ken Saro-Wiwa’s death sentence (“Clinton Seeking”). Less than 
two months later, Abacha announced he would grant clemency to the forty prisoners, but 
still refused to release Abiola or commute Saro-Wiwa’s sentence (French, “Nigeria 
Chief”). In November 1995, when Abacha’s regime went ahead with the execution of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogoni Nine, the United States responded by extending the 
ban of military sales and aid to Nigeria (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1997”).  
The United States had already placed sanctions on Nigeria in 1994 due to its 
“uncooperative” country status in the war against narcotics (“Speaking Softly”). This 
time the United States attempted to enact stronger economic sanctions against Nigeria at 
an international level and asked the international community to join in banning all new 
foreign investment in Nigeria and in freezing the international financial assets of Nigerian 
leaders (Lewis, “U.S. Seeking”). However, the United States’ push for broader economic 
sanctions failed to gain broad support as it faced international opposition, notably from 
the United Kingdom, France, and Netherlands, all of whom had strong trade interests in 
Nigeria and opposed broader measures arguing that eliminating foreign direct investment 
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in Nigeria would hurt the Nigerian economy and subsequently Nigeria’s impoverished 
population (Myers; “Human Rights Watch World Report 1997”). 
Despite its diplomatic and economic pressure to urge a return to democracy in 
Nigeria, the United States failed to use its strongest tool, an oil embargo. TransAfrica, an 
African-American political lobby in the US, urged the Clinton administration to enact an 
oil embargo to push for democracy in Nigeria, noting that the US was the largest 
purchaser of Nigeria’s petroleum (French, “Nigeria Chief”). However, at least two 
lobbying firms, the Corporate Council on Africa and the National Foreign Trade Council, 
which represented American business interests, persuaded on the Clinton administration 
not to enact tougher sanctions or an oil embargo as both would hurt American businesses 
in Nigeria (Lewis, “U.S. Seeking”). Whether due to political pressure or a reliance on 
Nigerian oil imports, the United States never seriously threatened to enforce an oil 
embargo and was largely a failure when it came to pressuring the Abacha regime to hand 
over power. 
Chinese Foreign Policy Toward Nigeria During Abacha’s Rule 
During Abacha’s rule (1993-1998) China did not have a strong presence in 
Nigeria. When Abacha took power in 1993 China became a net importer of oil for the 
first time. However, China did not import any Nigerian petroleum during 1993, 1994, 
1996, or 1997. China imported Nigerian crude oil only during two years of Abacha’s 
rule, 1995 and 1998. For both 1995 and 1998, the amount of Nigerian crude oil that 
China imported was relatively small (see Appendix Table A1). While oil trade was 
minimal during this time, Nigeria and China’s relationship was developing. This 
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relationship was fostered by multiple official visits and exchanges, which helped pave the 
way for greater cooperation in trade and development. In 1995, the Chinese Vice Premier 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, paid an official visit to Nigeria. A year 
later, Chinese engineers from the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation 
traveled to Nigeria to assess Nigeria’s railroad for infrastructure improvement projects 
(Chibundu 15). Nigerian officials also visited China. In 1996, Ernest Shonekan, the chair 
of Nigeria’s Vision 2010 committee, visited to China to study China’s Economic 
Development and Vision 2010 agenda. In 1997 Abubakar traveled with a high-level 
military delegation to China to discuss increased military cooperation with his Chinese 
counterparts (Chibundu 13-14). Later, in 1998, China provided short term military 
training courses at Chinese military facilities for Nigerian Armed Forces Personnel 
(Chibundu 14). When the Chinese Premier of State Council, Li Peng, met with General 
Abacha in May 1997 the visit resulted in several trade and development agreements, 
including on cooperation in Nigeria’s oil industry (Chibundu 16). In addition to official 
visits, several commissions expanded Nigeria and China’s cultural and trade 
relationships. Notably, the Nigeria-China Joint Commission (NCJC) also fostered trade 
between the two countries during Abacha’s rule. The NCJC is the instrument for the 
execution of bilateral trade, economic, and technological cooperation between Nigeria 
and China (Chibundu 19). The value of overall trade between the two countries grew 
significantly from 1.3 billion naira in 1990 to 5.3 billion in 1996 (Utomi 40). Also 
significant, was the Implementation Programme for Cultural and Educational 
Cooperation established in 1997 (Chibundu 47). This agreement established 
77 
 
arrangements for multiple cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries 
for the next two years. 
China maintained its non-interventionist foreign policy toward Nigeria as the 
countries developed foreign relations and increased trade. China did not participate in or 
support efforts by the international community to condemn the Abacha regime or the 
United States’ call to enact tougher sanctions. From 1993 to 1998 the United Nations 
Security Council did not pass any resolutions regarding the situation in Nigeria. This may 
be partly because countries which had trade relationships with Nigeria, such as the United 
Kingdom and France which were permanent members of the Security Council and could 
effectively veto resolutions, would have likely blocked increased sanctions (“Human 
Rights Watch World Report 1997”). However, there is an indication that China would 
have also opposed sanctions against Nigeria based on human rights. In 1995, China voted 
no on United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/50/199, which condemned the 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and urged Nigeria to implement a transition to democracy 
(“United Nations Bibliographic”). Although the resolution ultimately passed, China’s no 
vote provides insight that China’s non-interventionist policy applied to Nigeria. 
China’s non-interventionist policy may have benefited Abacha’s regime at times, 
such as during United Nations votes, but China’s petroleum diplomacy likely had little to 
no causal effect on Nigeria’s Freedom House scores. From 1993 to 1998 China imported 
little to no Nigerian crude oil and Nigeria’s scores remained around seven and six on the 
Freedom House scale. With both scores being the lowest possible score, Nigeria’s 
Freedom House scores could only improve. The correlation between an increased 
Chinese economic involvement and improved Nigerian Freedom House scores is simply 
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due to the coincidental increase in Chinese oil imports from Niger (required to meet 
consumption needs), Nigeria’s scores improving with the death of Abacha, and the 
subsequent end of his military dictatorship. 
1998 – 1999: Abubakar’s Transition Program 
The Impact of Abubakar’s Transition Program on Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties 
 General Abacha’s sudden death in 1998 marked a turning point for political rights 
and civil liberties in Nigeria. First, his appointed successor, General Abdusalami 
Abubakar, took immediate steps to promote political freedom and eased decrees 
restricting civil liberties, notably decrees which restricted press freedoms. Second, 
Abubakar initiated a transition program which resulted in democratic elections with 
seven months, in January 1999. 
 General Abacha died on 8 June 1998, and General Abubakar was quickly sworn 
in the next day (McFadden). Abubakar took steps to improve political freedoms, notably 
by freeing political prisoners. Abubakar’s treatment of political prisoners may have 
helped Nigeria’s political rights score, but only minimally so. In July 1998, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo was released from prison (“Abubakar Pardons”). However, Abubakar 
did not release M.K.O. Abiola, who was to be emancipated shortly after Abacha’s death, 
but died suddenly under suspicious circumstances while incarcerated (McFadden). Later 
in December 1998, Abubakar freed Sheik el-Zak Zaky, a radical Shi’ite Muslim preacher 
who had been jailed over clashes with police in 1996 (“Nigeria Frees”). Additionally, 163 
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bank executives remained in detention without charge and close followers of Abacha 
were also detained on corruption charges (“Human Rights Watch World Report 1999”).  
Abubakar’s quick actions to reinvigorate the transition process to a democratically 
elected civilian government and the subsequent elections also helped to improve 
Nigeria’s political rights score. For example, Abubakar dissolved the transitional 
authority created by Abacha which was making little progress toward a democratic 
government (“Nigerian Leader to Unveil”). Abubakar also dissolved the existing five 
Obasanjo-era political parties and eased restrictions on party formation allowing new 
political parties to form. By November 1998, nine new parties had been registered 
(“Nigeria Eases”). On 4 December 1998, Nigeria held local primary elections to 
nominate presidential candidates (“Obasanjo’s Party”). A little over a month later 
national elections were held in which former General Olusegun Obasanjo was declared 
the winner of the Nigerian presidency. The elections were declared to be free and fair 
overall by international observers who reported voting was more orderly, electoral 
officials better trained, and security around voting station improved over the December 
1998 elections (Onishi, “Observers Give”). On 29 May, Abubakar completed the 
transition phase by handing over Nigeria’s 24-day-old constitution to Obasanjo, and 
along with it, power to lead a civilian government of 774 newly elected local officials, 36 
newly elected state governors, and newly elected state and national legislatures (Onishi, 
“Nigeria’s Military”).  
 Abubakar’s administration (June 1998 – May 1999) made significant 
improvements and progress towards democracy, but not all his policies and decisions 
resulted in positive developments. Violence in the Delta region held back civil liberties. 
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As interim ruler, he continued to protect oil infrastructure at the expense of civilian lives. 
In early January 1999, there were 19 reported deaths, some as a result of soldiers’ 
gunfire, among protestors who were demonstrating against the oil industry in the Delta 
region (“Government Lays”). Moreover, the 1999 elections experienced problems which 
limited the improvement of Nigeria’s political rights score. There were reports of ghost 
names on ballots, resulting in a list of 60 million voter names, rather than the anticipated 
40 million (“Suspicion Over”). Additionally, voter turnout was reportedly low, around 
five percent in some northern states, while elections were completely cancelled in 
Bayelsa due to violence (Onishi, “Observers Give”). Overall Abubakar’s policies 
improved political rights and civil liberties in Nigeria. The transition laid an important 
stepping stone to the longest period of civilian rule since independence. Moreover, 
Abubakar’s handover to civilian rule paved the way for the country to begin democratic 
reforms. As a result, Nigeria’s Freedom House scores rose significantly in 1999 from 
what they were in the mid-1990’s.  
1999 – 2007: Obasanjo’s Presidency (The Beginning of the Fourth Republic) 
 Abubakar’s transition program came to fruition with national elections in 1999. 
Olusegun Obasanjo won the 1999 national election for the Nigerian presidency and won 
again for re-election in 2003. Political rights during Obasanjo’s administration (1999 – 
2007) significantly improved. Restrictions on political parties and opposition were lifted 
and elected officials, rather than military leaders, created and enacted laws and policies. 
However, Nigeria still faced two obstacles to improving political rights during 
Obasanjo’s two terms as Nigeria’s president. First, Obasanjo’s administration was 
unsuccessful in significantly reducing corruption. Second, democratic processes, 
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including elections, still didn’t function well during Obasanjo’s tenure. While civil 
liberties during Obasanjo’s presidency were more respected than under Abacha’s regime, 
violence, often between Muslims and Christians, and the government’s aggressive use of 
the military as a response to violence countered positive improvements to Nigeria’s civil 
liberties score. 
Political Rights During Obasanjo’s Presidency 
 Nigeria’s political rights score was hampered by the Obasanjo administration’s 
struggle to significantly reduce corruption in the new democratic government. In 1999 
Obasanjo created panels to investigate past embezzlement by government officials and 
introduced an anti-corruption bill into the Nigerian senate (“Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2000”). By March 2000 The New York Times reported that Obasanjo’s 
administration had removed from office and brought legal charges against hundreds of 
military and government officials (“Violence in Nigeria”). In 2000 the legislature passed 
anti-corruption legislation; and the government recovered some of the money stolen by 
former officials. However, in 2002, Freedom House stated in its Freedom in the World 
Report on Nigeria that despite government anti-corruption reforms the Nigerian judiciary 
remained corrupt, inefficient, and susceptible to political influences (“Country Report: 
Nigeria 2002”). Human Rights Watch also noted that in addition to a corrupt judicial 
system Nigeria’s police force was often corrupted by bribery (“Human Rights Watch 
World Report 2003”). Obasanjo attempted to address corruption by creating the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in December 2002 which initially 
focused on fighting email scams originating from Nigeria but by 2004 had turned its 
attention to public officials (“Corruption on Trial”). Obasanjo appointed a former 
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assistant police commissioner, Nuhu Ribadu, as executive chairman of the EFCC. Ribadu 
oversaw dozens of corruption investigations of Nigeria public officials, including several 
state governors (“Corruption on Trial”).
11
  However, a year later, Transparency 
International ranked Nigeria 144 out of 146 countries by in its Corruption Perceptions 
Index, indicating that little progress had been made (“Country Report: Nigeria 2005”).
12
 
The next year, Nigeria did improve its ranking slightly, to 152 out of 159, probably in 
large part to the arrests of government officials over corruption charges, including 
Senator Adolphus Wabara and Education Minister Fabian Osuji (“Country Report: 
Nigeria 2006”). In 2006, when legislation was introduced which would alter Nigeria’s 
constitution to allow Obasanjo to run for a third term, several opponents of the bill 
claimed they had been offered bribes to change their vote (“Democracy ‘Triumphs’”). 
The amendment failed and by the end of Obasanjo’s tenure corruption was still pervasive, 
but Nigeria’s Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index rank improved to 
142 out of 163 countries by 2006 (“Country Report: Nigeria 2007”).  Although the 
Obasanjo administration hardly eliminated corruption entirely from the government, its 
anti-corruption reforms, notably the creations of the EFCC, still helped to reduce 
corruption and subsequently contributed to an improved Freedom House political rights 
score.   
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Ribadu’s removal is further discussed in the next section on political rights during Yar’Adua’s 
presidency. 
12
 Nigeria’s Finance Minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, contested the low ranking on the grounds that 
Transparency International did not consider current anti-corruption reforms in its decision 
(Nigeria…Ranking).   
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Civil Liberties During Obasanjo’s Presidency 
 Civil liberties under Obasanjo’s regime were more respected and protected than 
under Abacha’s regime. Notably, there was more freedom of the press and freedom to 
assemble since Abacha’s previous decrees restricting these rights had been lifted and both 
rights were guaranteed by the constitution and generally respected (“Country Report: 
Nigeria 2002”). Despite improvements to freedom of press and freedom of religion due to 
implementation of Nigeria’s new constitution, Nigeria’s Freedom House civil liberties 
score only improved to a four in 2000 before falling to a five in 2001 and 2002. In 2003 it 
rose to a four again where it remained throughout Obasanjo’s tenure (“Country Report: 
Nigeria 2004”; “Country Report: Nigeria 2008”).  
 Shortly after taking office in 1999, Obasanjo’s administration attempted to rein in 
the military by reducing the number of military personnel from 80,000 to 50,000 over 
four years; however, abuse, executions, and torture still occurred at the hands of security 
forces despite the dismantling of abusive paramilitary forces and reorganization of the 
police (“Human Rights Watch World Report 2000”). The next year, in a national 
television broadcast, Obasanjo’s administration authorized police to shoot members of 
the Odua People’s Congress (OPC) opposition group which resulted in increased 
brutality and summary executions. In one case police killed approximately twenty 
civilians in the town of Suleja in response to riots (“Human Rights Watch World Report 
2001”). In 2001, Obasanjo sent the Nigerian army into the central state Benue to disarm a 
local militia and to arrest citizens responsible for the murder of 19 Nigerian soldiers by 
members of a local militia (Onishi, “Nigeria Army”). According to a BBC News report, 
the army enacted revenge for the murders by killing over 200 civilians, despite orders 
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from Obasanjo to cease operations in Benue (“Army Clampdown”). However, The New 
York Times four days later claimed that over 500 civilians had been killed and houses 
burned by the Nigerian army (Onishi, “Nigeria Army”). The army’s killings appeared to 
have been committed with impunity as Obasanjo excused the soldiers’ behavior as acts of 
self-defense during an interview on state television (Onishi, “Nigerian Army”). It seemed 
possible that the Nigerian government might be taking the first steps toward addressing 
police brutality when President Obasanjo publically admitted the Nigerian police tortured 
and killed criminal suspects in 2005 and five police officers were charged with murder 
(“President Said”). However, police violence continued. In 2006, Nigeria’s Centre for 
Law Enforcement Education which found that police killed 1 in 20 motorists at check 
points for failing to pay bribes indicating that police and military brutality was still 
common (“Country Report: Nigeria 2007”). The violent acts committed by the policy and 
military against civilians weren’t ordered by the government as had been the case during 
Abacha’s rule. However, Obasanjo’s administration fell short of the expectation for a 
democratically elected government to protect civilian life and this failure contributed to 
Nigeria’s poor civil liberties rating. 
 Multiple political assassinations, conducted at all levels of government, 
demonstrate rampant corruption and hindered opportunities for political opposition to 
develop by preventing political challengers from having a realistic opportunity to win 
office. Politically motivated killings, often committed by hired thugs, were common. In 
December 2001, armed gunmen shot and killed Justice Minister Bola Ige, reportedly over 
his political opposition to the implementation of Shari’a law (“Emergency Declared”). In 
October 2002, armed attackers pulled Barnabas Igwe, the chairman of the Anambra state 
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Nigerian Bar Association and vocal critic of the governor of Anambra, from his car at a 
traffic stop. The attackers shot, stabbed, and killed Igwe and his wife (Onishi, “Nigerian 
Militias”). Violence increased around the 2003 elections and political assassinations 
continued (“Country Report: Nigeria 2005”).  In 2006, Funsho Williams, a likely 
candidate for Lagos state governor and PDP member, and Ayo Daramola, a candidate for 
governor in the Ekiti state were both murdered (“Country Report: Nigeria 2007”).   
 Religious violence also plagued Nigeria during Obasanjo’s presidency and further 
hindered Nigeria’s civil liberties score. Ironically, Freedom House reports the decline in 
Nigeria’s civil liberties rating during 2001 and 2002 was due to ethnic and religious 
outbreaks of violence which resulted from increased religious freedom that allowed for 
the implementation of Shari’a law. In November 1999 fighting in Lagos between Yoruba 
and Hausa ethnicities resulted in the deaths of over 100 people. The ethnic clashes were 
due to tensions among the Hausa over the election of Obasanjo, a southern Yoruba. 
Obasanjo’s response to the violence was an authorization for the police to shoot 
“troublemakers” (“Hundreds Flee”). A month later, Northern Muslims displayed their 
regional influence by implementing Shari’a law in the northern state of Zamfara. 
Although state officials claimed Shari’a would only be used to settle civil and criminal 
disputes among Muslims, it raised religious tensions as Christians feared it would impact 
them as well (Onishi, “A Nigerian State”). In January 2000, Christian women were 
already denied taxi services for having their heads uncovered and Obasanjo had still 
failed to openly condemn Shari’a law, adding to Christians’ fears (Phillips). 
 By February 2000 a man was caned 80 times for drinking in public (“Muslim 
Caning”). The same month police in Kaduna requested reinforcements to contain violent 
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clashes between Christians and Muslims as tensions continued to rise (Pearce). Only one 
month later, in March 2000, The New York Times reported that over 400 people had been 
killed by the riots in Kaduna (Onishi, “New Strife”). Moreover, the article noted that 
Obasanjo still had not openly criticized Shari’a law. Tensions mounted as Shari’a law 
spread to other states. In August 2000, Borno became the seventh state to implement 
Shari’a (Onishi, “Gulf Grows”). By October 2000, the BBC News reported that the 
Nigerian army had to be deployed to Minna, a Northern city, to suppress religious 
violence (“Ethnic Unrest”). In September 2001, violent clashes also broke out in the 
central Nigerian city of Jos (“Religious and Ethnic”). By the end of 2001, over 1,000 
people died in religious clashes in Jos (“Muslims Riot”). In 2002, Human Rights Watch 
reported women and men were sentenced to death by stoning for adultery (“Human 
Rights Watch World Report 2003”). The report also noted that, although Obasanjo 
criticized execution by stoning, his administration still failed to prevent such methods of 
execution. The same year, the total number of states implementing Shari’a law reached 
twelve: Sokoto, Jigawa, Niger, Zamfara, Yobe, Kaduna, Katsina, Borno, Bauchi, Kano, 
Kebbi, Gombe (“Sharia Law”). In 2003 a Nigerian woman’s sentence to death by stoning 
was overturned by an appellate court indicating possible improvement of criminal and 
civil legal procedures under Shari’a law and possibly a reduction in religious tension 
(Habila). Unfortunately, in 2004, a Christian ethnic group in Yelwa killed around 60 
Muslims, resulting in a Muslim retaliation which killed at least 30 (“Muslim Mobs”). As 
a result of the retaliation, 20,000 Christians fled their homes in Yelwa (Sengupta). By 
May 2004, the BBC News reported that over 10,000 Nigerians had died in “communal 
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violence” in Nigeria often as a result of religious tension between Muslims and Christians 
since 1999 (Isaacs).  
Although the majority of news reporting focused on ethnic and religious violence 
Nigeria’s civil liberties score was also unable to rise above a four due to violations of 
women’s and children’s rights. Women faced legal discrimination at a national level. 
From 1999 – 2003, Human Rights Watch World Reports on Nigeria noted that it 
remained legal for a man to physically harm his wife so long as he did not cause 
“grievous hurt”, usually considered to be loss of sight, hearing, mobility, or facial 
maiming. Moreover, women’s legal rights were especially restricted in states which 
implemented Shari’a law. In 1999, when Zamfara instituted Shari’a law women found 
their freedoms and rights restricted. For example, women were not permitted to ride in 
taxis with men and were required to cover their heads in order to ride in “women only” 
taxis (Phillips). Women also received harsh punishments under Shari’a law. In 2003, a 
woman was sentenced to death for adultery, despite several procedural errors made by the 
Shari’a court (Habila). Human trafficking of women was a significant problem during 
Obasanjo’s presidency. A 2003 United States Department of State report on human rights 
in Nigeria noted that Nigeria had an active market for trafficking in women and children 
while the government had not taken any steps to prevent the sale of women and girls into 
marriage (“Country Reports”).  
Effect of Nigeria’s Oil Industry on Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
As during Abacha’s rule, outbreaks of regional violence during Obasanjo’s 
presidency were frequently centered on oil production in the Delta. Civilian casualties 
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resulted from both attacks by militant groups and from violent police responses. 
Moreover, despite the ongoing violence and attacks on oil infrastructure, oil companies 
continued to invest in Nigeria. When Obasanjo took office in 1999, violence was already 
common in the Nigerian Delta. When violence erupted in the town of Warri in June 1999, 
Obasanjo’s administration responded by sending in troops to quell the violence 
(“Violence Erupts”). Shortly afterward, Obasanjo travelled to Warri and promised to 
initiatives designed to help the impoverished Delta residents and reduce violence, such as 
a cash for guns program and a jobs for young men program (“Change Promised”). 
Violence continued and in November 1999 Obasanjo sent in Nigerian military troops to 
the region, troops which reportedly burned villages in attempts to suppress rebel youths 
(Soldiers ‘Killed’”). In June 2000, Obasanjo again sent the Nigerian military to the Delta 
after 12 police officers were murdered by militants (“Oil: Nigeria’s Blessing”). The 
violence did not preclude oil companies from investing in Nigeria. Two months later, in 
August 2000, US oil company Conoco bid $164 million to jointly develop an offshore oil 
field in Nigeria (“Conoco Bids”). Obasanjo’s goals included not only increased and 
steady oil production, but increased national and local involvement in the industry to 
increase Nigeria’s share of oil revenue and to counter unemployment in the country. In 
August 2001, Obasanjo’s administration encouraged talks between Nigeria’s state-owned 
oil company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and foreign oil companies to 
award more oil contracts to and facilitate the involvement of Nigerian companies in the 
oil industry (“Nigeria Explores”). Despite continuing investments, regional violence 
often reduced or shut down oil production in the Delta. In March 2003 Shell closed five 
oil flow stations in the Delta when militant fighting left five people dead (“Shell 
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Nigeria”). The New York Times reported the fighting, between Ijaw and Itsekiri rival 
militant groups, resulted after the Ijaws accused Obasanjo of altering voting boundaries 
to benefit the Itsekiri in the next election (“ChevronTexaco Shuts”).  
In 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
emerged (“Growing Power”). MEND followed in the footsteps of previous Delta rights 
groups such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). MOSOP, led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, organized in 
1990 (Hanson, “MEND: The Niger”). Although MOSOP’s campaign was non-violent 
unlike MEND’s, the two groups protested several of same issues, such as environmental 
degradation to the Delta region caused by major oil companies, the inability of local 
residents to farm or develop agriculture in the Delta as a result of environmental 
degradation, government mishandling of oil revenues, and the government’s oil revenue 
distribution policies (Hanson, “MEND: The Niger”).  In 2006, MEND held several 
foreigners, including Americans, hostage, in attempts to pressure the government to 
allocate a greater share of oil revenue to the region (Polgreen, “Militants Free”). By the 
end of 2006, at least 50 expatriate oil workers had been taken hostage and released 
unharmed (Maier). MEND increased attacks on oil companies, their employees, and 
military forces deployed to the region during 2006. October 2006 was an especially 
violent month in the Delta. MEND claimed responsibility for the deaths of 17 soldiers as 
well as multiple attacks on supply boats (Maier). Near the end of Obasanjo’s term, in 
February 2007, kidnapping attacks and armed conflict had continued, but not all were the 
responsibility of MEND. Local armed gangs had reportedly engaged in copycat tactics 
(Ashby). It was not necessarily the presence of the oil industry in the Delta which caused 
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violence. Rather, violence by armed gangs and militants was in response to the real 
and/or perceived unfairness of oil companies’ practices and the Nigerian government’s 
oil revenue distribution policies. Although Nigeria’s oil industry was not an inherent 
cause of violence, it was a central focal point of militant attacks which contributed to 
Nigeria’s low civil liberties score.  
US Foreign Policy Toward Nigeria During Obasanjo’s Presidency 
During Abacha’s regime, the main goal of the United States’ foreign policy in 
Nigeria had been to encourage a transition to democracy without losing access to 
Nigeria’s oil supply as evidenced by the Clinton administration’s refusal to employ an oil 
embargo. Once Obasanjo assumed the presidency the United States moved quickly to 
restore diplomatic relations and resume aid. In September 1999 the United States pledged 
to help the young Nigerian government recover millions of dollars in American banks 
that former military officials had embezzled (“Nigerian Heading”). The next month, 
during an official visit to Abuja, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced the 
US would triple or quadruple the amount of foreign aid to Nigeria (Onishi, “Albright 
Vows”). In August 2000 Clinton travelled to Nigeria, the first time an American 
president had visited since 1978 (Lacey). Clinton’s visit provided evidence that the 
United States’ foreign policy in Nigeria still focused on oil supplies. During his visit, 
Clinton reportedly encouraged Nigeria to work with the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries to lower oil prices and pushed Obasanjo to reduce corruption and 
inefficiencies in Nigeria’s oil production industry while promising to help reduce 
Nigeria’s foreign debt and pledging $80 million to fight HIV/AIDS in Nigeria (Lacey; 
Dagne).  The Clinton administration appeared to be willing to overlook human rights and 
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good governance issues in Nigeria now that an elected government had been installed. 
During his trip to Nigeria 2000, Clinton did not publicly criticize Nigeria for human 
rights violations. Moreover, Clinton issued a waiver for Nigeria’s noncompliance of the 
requirements for the counter-narcotics certification of the Foreign Assistance Act, which 
allowed the US to give Nigeria foreign aid (“Human Rights Watch World Report 2001”). 
Under the Bush administration relations between Abuja and Washington D.C. 
continued to improve as Bush maintained many of the same policies as Clinton. In 2001, 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had a $20 million 
budget for democracy and good governance support to Nigeria (“Human Rights Watch 
World Report 2002”). Despite a report by the US Department of State detailing human 
rights violations in Nigeria, USAID’s budget for assistance to Nigeria grew to $80 
million in 2002 (“Human Rights Watch World Report 2003”). In 2005 the United States 
followed through on debt reduction promises when the US and seven European states 
forgave $18 billion of Nigeria’s $30 billion debt, reducing Nigeria’s debt from thirty-six 
percent of its gross domestic product to less than four percent (“Background Note: 
Nigeria”).  
The Bush administration’s policy toward Nigeria also focused on counter-drug 
trafficking efforts. In 2008, Bush named Nigeria as one of 20 major drug transit or illicit 
drug producing countries (“Memorandum for the Secretary”). To assist Nigeria in the 
fight against drug-trafficking, Washington gave body scanners to Nigerian police forces 
for use in its major international airports (“Memorandum for the Secretary”). By August 
2005, the US had recommenced military aid and had begun training Nigerian troops for 
peacekeeping missions in Africa (Crossette). Human Rights Watch noted in its reports on 
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Nigeria for 2005 – 2007 that the US failed to exert meaningful pressure on Nigeria to 
address human rights concerns, indicating the United States was stronger on rhetoric than 
on action, as the US had often been with Abacha’s regime when the United States was 
unwilling to employ unilateral embargoes to promote human rights in Nigeria. 
Chinese Foreign Policy Toward Nigeria During Obasanjo’s Presidency 
Obasanjo maintained Nigeria’s increased level of engagement with China. As 
president-elect, Obasanjo visited China to reaffirm Nigeria’s support of the “One China” 
policy and reaffirm Nigeria’s cooperative stance toward China (Chibundu 14-15). 
Exchanges resulting from the Implementation Programme for Cultural and Educational 
Cooperation continued. Two Chinese cultural troupes performed in Nigeria, while, in 
1999, several pieces of Nigerian artwork were placed on display at the Grand Exhibition 
of African Arts in Beijing. Additionally, Nigeria participated in China’s 1999 
International Year Folk Song and Dance (Chibundu 49). As it had done during Abacha’s 
rule, China continued to provide foreign investment in and developmental assistance to 
Nigeria. In 2000, Nigeria contracted the China Civil Engineering Corporation to build 
5,000 athlete housing units in Abuja for the All Africa Games (Utomi 41). As part of a 
National Programme for Food Security established in 2001, China dispatched over 500 
agricultural experts and technicians to Nigeria to assist in food production and water 
conservancy efforts (“Success Stories - Nigeria”). In 2005, Nigeria was the third largest 
African investor in China, although it only account of 1.3% of total investment in China 
(“China’s Foreign Policy” 119). China invested more heavily in Nigeria. In 2006, Nigeria 
was one of the largest recipients of Chinese loans, which were heavily weighted toward 
infrastructure projects (“China’s Foreign Policy” 118). The Forum on China-Africa 
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Cooperation (FOCAC) was established and held its First Ministerial Conference, in 
which Nigeria participated, in October 2000 (“First Ministerial”). FOCAC provides a 
platform for continued Sino-African cooperation every three years when it holds its 
ministerial conferences. At the 2006 FOCAC conference, China and twelve African 
states agreed to $1.9 billion worth of deals, including a commitment from China to build 
expressways in Nigeria (Aizhu and Beck). 
Trade between the two countries also continued to increase. By 2005, overall 
trade between China and Nigeria was valued at $42 billion (“Trade to Top”). From 2003 
to 2006, China was the third largest exporter of conventional and small arms sales to 
Africa (Germany and Russia were the two largest), sales which included arms deals with 
Nigeria (“China’s Foreign Policy” 112). Between 2001 and 2006, 89% of China’s 
African imports came from seven African countries, including Nigeria. Imports from all 
but one of the seven, consisted primarily of oil (“China’s Foreign Policy” 121). 
Moreover, from 2006 through 2010, Nigeria was China’s fourth largest African trading 
partner, exporting crude oil, ore, petroleum gases, and nonferrous base metals to China 
(“FOCAC”).  
During Obasanjo’s presidency (1999 – 2007) China increased its imports of 
Nigerian oil and became more active in the Nigerian oil industry. In January 2000 the 
Chinese foreign minister visited Nigeria, reportedly to discuss Chinese imports of 
Nigerian oil (“China’s Foreign Minister”). Chinese oil deals in Nigeria focused on 
securing oil for years at a time. In 2005, China signed an $800 million deal with Nigeria 
to buy oil for the next five years as it was also assisting in the rebuilding of Nigeria’s 
railroad system (Leggett; Lyman). The same year, the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou 
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Wenzhong was quoted as saying China would refrain from intertwining politics and 
business, unlike Western countries, and would oppose embargos (Lyman). In 2006, 
China purchased a $4 billion stake in a Nigerian offshore oil field to further secure access 
to oil imports (Pan). Additionally, China purchased a controlling stake in Nigeria’s 
Kaduna refinery and committed to further construction on Nigeria’s rail system and to 
construction of new power stations (“China and Nigeria”). Soon after China signed its 
2006 oil deal, MEND warned Chinese companies they would be targets of attacks if they 
engaged in oil production in the Delta (“China Warned”). MEND’s threats against 
China’s proposed oil investments and trade agreements illustrate MEND’s opposition to 
the Nigerian government’s oil revenue distribution policies and the unaddressed 
environmental degradation to the Delta, rather than opposition to any particular foreign 
country or specific oil company operating in the Delta. 
2007 – 2010: Yar’Adua’s and Jonathan’s Presidencies 
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, a Muslim governor from Northern Nigeria, became the 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate for president after being backed by President 
Obasanjo (“Uncertainty Over Nigeria”). Despite allegations of nepotism (Yar’Adua was 
rumored to have received Obasanjo’s support due to his brother’s position as Obasanjo’s 
deputy in the 1970’s), Yar’Adua was elected president in April 2007 resulting in 
continued political dominance by the PDP (“Surprise at Nigerian”). However, in 2009, 
President Yar’Adua left Nigeria and flew to Saudi Arabia where he received medical 
treatment for heart problems, during which time the Nigerian senate named Vice 
President Goodluck Jonathan, a Southerner, acting president of Nigeria in February 2010. 
Shortly afterwards, Yar’Adua passed away on 5 May 2010. With his succession to the 
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presidency, Goodluck Jonathan became the first Nigerian president from the Niger Delta 
region. Jonathan’s appointment as acting-president upset the traditional rotation of the 
presidency between a Northern and a Southern Nigerian resulting in riots in the Muslim 
North and divisions with the PDP over who to nominate as a presidential nominee. 
Political Rights During Yar’Adua’s and Jonathan’s Presidencies 
In 2007 Nigeria’s Freedom House political rights score was a four, but fell to a 
five in 2008 and 2009, before rising to a four in 2010. According to Freedom House, 
fraudulent elections, which resulted in the Peoples’ Democratic Party’s consolidation of 
political power, was one of the main reasons Nigeria’s political rights score fell to a five 
(“Country Reports: Nigeria 2009”). Before the 2007 elections, the Network of Mobile 
Election Monitors began preparations to ensure free and fair elections which included 
using text messaging to alert officials to fraud and working with observers from the 
European Union (“Texts Monitor”). Despite their attempts to carry out fair elections, the 
2007 elections were widely criticized by international observers and human rights groups. 
Human Rights Watch described the elections as “marred by fraud, violence, and 
intimidation so pervasive as to destroy all confidence in the results” (“Human Rights 
Watch World Report 2008”). Yar’Adua’s landslide victory with seventy percent of the 
votes coupled with observers’ criticisms cast further doubt on the elections legitimacy. 
One of Yar’Adua’s opponents, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, won a legal 
challenge to run for president shortly before the election. As a result, elections were 
delayed two hours to allow for printing of new ballots with his name (Quist-Arcton). The 
delay additionally caused vote counting to occur after sunset in the dark and no artificial 
lighting was provided (“What Nigerian”). Both the observers from the European Union 
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and observers from the Transition Monitoring Group declared the election flawed, citing 
incidents of ballot stuffing, premarked ballots, and missing ballots in some locations 
(“What Nigerian”). Along with the presidency, PDP candidates won 87 out of 109 senate 
seats, 263 out of 360 house seats, and 28 out of 36 governorships (“Country Reports: 
Nigeria 2008”). Yar’Adua’s opponents challenged the election results on the grounds that 
they were fraudulent. Nigeria’s Freedom House political rights score didn’t immediately 
fall, as Freedom House waited to see what the outcome of the legal challenges would be. 
By February 2008 election tribunals had overturned 6 of the 36 governorship election 
results (Polgreen, “A Battle”). However, the Nigerian Supreme Court upheld Yar’Adua’s 
victory in the 2007 presidential election and election tribunals upheld enough election 
results to allow the PDP to remain the dominant ruling party causing Freedom House to 
lower Nigeria’s political rights score to a five through 2009 due to fraud and lack of 
political opposition as the PDP’s marginalization of opposing minority political parties 
(“Country Reports: Nigeria 2009”; “Country Reports: Nigeria 2010”).  
However, the political situation improved in 2010. After Yar’Adua left Nigeria in 
November 2009 to seek medical treatment, Vice President Goodluck Jonathan became 
acting president and initiated electoral reform. In April 2010, Jonathan asked the 
chairman of the Independent National Election Commission (INEC), Maurice Iwu, to 
step down, mostly due to his mishandling of the 2007 election process (Onuah). Likely 
motived by an opportunity to prove his commitment to electoral reform and preemptively 
avoid a repeat of shambolic 2007 elections, Jonathan also submitted an electoral reform 
bill to the Nigerian legislature. The 2010 Electoral Act stipulated and clarified procedures 
for the next election, including the order of elections, candidacy filing deadlines, and 
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voter registration deadlines (Eboh). As a result of the electoral reforms, Freedom House 
raised Nigeria’s political rights score to a four in 2010 (“Country Reports: Nigeria 
2011”).  
Corruption was the second factor hindering Nigeria’s political rights score. 
Although Yar’Adua was known for his integrity and his uncompromising policies against 
corruption, his poor health prevented him from enforcing all his proposed anti-corruption 
reforms. During Yar’Adua’s presidency several government officials were involved in 
corruption scandals or charged with corruption. In 2007, Freedom House noted that 
Nigeria was ranked 147 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (“Country Reports: Nigeria 2008”). In October 2007, the Speaker of the 
Nigerian House of Representatives, Patricia Etteh, was forced to resign after being 
accused of spending millions to renovate her office and purchase cars without approval 
(Polgreen, “A Nigerian”). In December 2007, police sent Nuhu Ribadu, the head of the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, to a remote training course for one year 
after the EFCC arrested James Ibori, a political ally of Yar’Adua, on corruption charges 
(Polgreen, “Nigeria Reassigns”). Ribadu was eventually fired from his position (“Country 
Reports: Nigeria 2009”). In 2008 Senator Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello, daughter of Olusegun 
Obasanjo, was charged with receiving kickbacks from the Nigerian Health Ministry 
(Polgreen, “Senator Faces”). In 2009, Ribadu’s replacement, Farida Waziri, filed 
corruption charges against prominent bankers (Tattersall, “Nigeria Threatens”). As a 
result, the EFCC recovered nearly 25.57 billion naira in bad loans owed to banks 
(Tattersall, “Nigeria Anti-Graft”). In 2010 a senate report on money laundering claimed 
former Vice President Abubakar transferred $40 million in questionable funds to banks in 
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the United States (Nossiter, “Academic Tackles”). Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index score for Nigeria reflected the government’s anti-corruption 
efforts. The score improved from 147 out of 178 in 2007 to 134 out of 178 in 2010 (“TI 
Corruption Perceptions Index”). Although the Nigerian government made attempts to 
reign in corruption, through the EFCC for example, corruption remained widespread and 
prevented Nigeria’s Freedom House political rights score from rising above a four 
(“Country Reports: Nigeria 2011”. 
Civil Liberties During Yar’Adua’s and Jonathan’s Presidencies 
From 2007 through 2010, Nigeria’s civil liberties score remained a four. Both 
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Reports and Human Rights’ Watch World 
Reports stated freedom of speech and freedom of press were fairly robust during this 
time. However, there were exceptions. For example, journalists were subject to 
intimidation, violence, and arrests. In 2007 the State Security Service (SSS) arrested 
activists, including two German journalists, for taking pictures and video of the oil 
industry in the Delta, but later dropped the charges (“Country Reports: Nigeria 2008”). In 
September 2008, Channels Television in Nigeria was shut down after broadcasting a 
report claiming President Yar’Adua was in poor health (“Nigeria Shuts”). In April 2010, 
Edo Ugbagw, a journalist for The Nation, was shot and killed at his home by gunmen 
(“Journos Killed”). Freedom of speech was also limited by Shari’a law. In March 2010, a 
Shari’a court in Kaduna issued a temporary ban forbidding the rights group Civil Rights 
Congress of Nigeria from posting debates of Shari’a’s use of amputation as a legal 
punishment on social networking websites (“Islamic Court”). By the end of March an 
appellate Shari’a court upheld the ban, making it permanent (Fabi).  
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Nigeria’s civil rights score was also held back by violations of minority groups’ 
rights. Nigeria’s federal law prohibited homosexual behavior, which could be punished 
by up to 14 years in prison (“Country Reports: Nigeria 2009”). In August 2007, 18 men 
were arrested in northern Nigeria for engaging in sodomy, wearing women’s clothing, 
and attending a gay wedding, charges which were punishable by death (“Gay 
Nigerians”). Although the charges were reduced to “indecent dressing”, possible legal 
punishment still include one year in prison or 30 lashes (“Clash Over”). Women’s rights 
continued to be suppressed under Shari’a law as they were during Obasanjo’s presidency. 
In 2007, northern states began using yellow rickshaws to transport women who couldn’t 
afford “women only” taxis, as women were still prohibited from riding on motorcycles or 
in taxis with men (Harris). Additionally, Nigerian law did not recognize spousal rape as a 
crime and women were denied equal legal rights to inherit property under Shari’a law as 
of 2010 (“Country Reports: Nigeria 2011”). Women and children continued to be victims 
of human trafficking. Forty percent of the 15 million child laborers in Nigeria were at risk 
of being trafficked while pregnant women seeking abortions were at risk of being held 
captive by scam artists until the baby was delivered and could be sold for adoption 
(“Country Reports: Nigeria 2011”). 
Despite these serious problems, the biggest detriment to Nigeria’s Freedom House 
civil liberties score was the ongoing violence, notably between Muslims and Christians, 
and the often violence police responses. Yar’Adua’s presidency began in the midst of 
violence. Religious violence between Muslims and Christians escalated in 2008. In 
November 2008 over 400 people died and 7,000 fled their homes when Christian and 
Muslim gangs clashed over local election results in Jos (Connors). A follow up article by 
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The New York Times reported that Nigerian government forces were responsible for at 
least 90 of the deaths in Jos after the regional governor issued a shoot to kill order to 
suppress violence (Polgreen, “Nigeria Forces”).  
Boko Haram, a radical Islamist group opposed to Western influences in Nigeria, 
notably Western education, was responsible for several outbreaks of violence. In July 
2009 Nigerian security forces responded to attacks by Boko Haram that resulted in at 
least 150 deaths over 4 days in Borno, Bauchi, Kano, and Yobe states (“Nigeria Army”). 
Another 30 people died in violent clashes between the police and Boko Haram when 
security forces attempted to suppress the violence (Nossiter, “Clashes Between”). In 
January 2010 sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians broke out again, this 
time killing over 320 people although neither Boko Haram nor any other fundamentalist 
Islamist sect was implicated in the fighting (Saka).  However, Boko Haram claimed 
responsibility for two bombings and an attack on a Christian church in Jos on Christmas 
Eve 2010 (Mshelizza and Owen). Under Yar’Adua’s presidency Nigerian police failed to 
maintain civil rest and prevent sectarian violence, often responding aggressively and 
causing additional bloodshed. The ongoing religious attacks and police brutality played a 
key role in precluding Nigeria’s civil liberties score from improving. 
Effect of Nigeria’s Oil Industry on Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
Violence in Nigeria was also linked to the country’s oil industry. Like his 
predecessor, Yar’Adua attempted to end violence and maintain oil production in the 
Delta by deploying military forces to suppress militants. In June 2008, when MEND 
claimed responsibility for an armed attack which shut down production at a Shell 
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offshore oil rig, Yar’Adua responded by sending the military to the region with orders to 
pursue militants and to help protect Shell’s oil facilities (Polgreen, “Oil Field”; “Security 
at Oil Field”).  In August 2008, MEND claimed to have killed 29 soldiers by using 
missiles and grenades in response to the killing of civilians by the military (“Nigeria 
Militants”). Fighting between the military and MEND lasted several days in September, 
costing Nigerian over 100,000 barrels per day in oil production and resulting in over 100 
deaths (“Oil Workers”). Yar’Adua offered militants a presidential pardon, rehabilitation 
training, and education to lay down their weapons (“Nigeria Offers”). Yar’Adua offered 
an additional gesture of reconciliation with MEND when he released the group’s leader, 
Henry Okah from prison. MEND responded to Okah’s release by announcing a 60-day 
ceasefire (“Militants Announce”). Yar’Adua even attempted to meet some of MEND’s 
grievances by going against the interests of MNOC’s with the creation of the Petroleum 
Industry Bill which reformed Nigeria’s oil industry, allocated more oil revenue to the 
Delta region, and called upon oil companies such as Shell to pay for rehabilitation 
programs needed to train Delta militants (“Yar’Adua Arm-Twists”; Agoi). However, 
Yar’Adua’s efforts to end corruption and violence in Nigeria’s oil industry were 
hampered by his worsening health and ultimately his death in 2009. When Goodluck 
Jonathan took over the presidency after Yar’Adua’s death he continued Yar’Adua’s 
amnesty program for Delta militants, but focused mostly on efforts to secure his position 
as the new president rather than on stabilizing the Delta, despite the region’s high 
expectations of support from Yar’Adua due to his Southern origin (Agoi).  
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US Foreign Policy Toward Nigeria During Yar’Adua’s and Jonathan’s Presidencies 
Between 2007 and 2010 US-Nigerian relations continued to improve. Nigeria 
remained a significant source of oil for the United States, being a top five oil supplier. 
During both Yar’Adua’s and Jonathan’s presidencies the US pushed Nigeria for political 
reforms to increase transparency and reduce corruption. In August 2009 Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton visited Nigeria. During a speech to Nigerian leaders Secretary 
Clinton praised Nigeria’s military but criticized Nigeria for rampant corruption and 
flawed elections while urging Nigeria to increase transparency in its government 
(Gettleman). In testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in February 
2010 Assistant Secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, Johnnie 
Carson, stated he had recently stressed electoral reform with Nigerian leaders for the 
upcoming 2011 elections and that USAID helped to fund efforts to conduct a joint-
electoral assessment designed to assist in improving electoral processes in Nigeria 
(“Examining the U.S.-Nigeria”). In 2010 the US established the Binational Commission 
between the United States and Nigeria. Secretary Clinton announced the U.S.-Nigeria 
Binational Commission would have four goals, the first of which was improving good 
governance and transparency (“Signing Ceremony”).  In light of this goal, the US worked 
with the Independent National Election Commission to assist Nigeria in preparing for the 
2011 elections to ensure transparency and fairness (“Remarks with Nigerian”). 
Another focus of US policy was the Commission’s second goal was to promote 
regional security and counterterrorism efforts. Yar’Adua’s presidency coincided with the 
creation and installation of a new US combatant command aimed protecting the national 
security interests of the United States in Africa through collaboration with African 
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partner states. In 2007, while Yar’Adua was in office, President Bush announced the 
creation of a new US combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM). Although 
Bush’s term in office was nearly over, AFRICOM’s conception was seen to fruition 
under the Obama administration. Nigeria worked cooperatively with the United States 
through joint training ventures and regional security exercises after AFRICOM became 
operational in October 2008 (“About United States”). In September 2009, AFRICOM 
hosted a Nigerian military delegation in Stuttgart, Germany to set the agenda for future 
US-Nigerian joint training events which prioritized capacity building and peacekeeping 
operations (Skinner).  
In December 2009 a Nigerian, Abdul Abdulmutallab, attempted to detonate an 
explosive device on an American air flight (Eggen, DeYoung, and Hsu). The attempted 
terrorist attack prompted the United States to continue to focus on counterterrorism 
efforts such as the US-conducted joint military exercises with Nigeria in early 2010. 
During the exercises, the USS Samuel B. Roberts provided anti-terrorism training for 
Nigerian military forces as well as military-to-military training, damage control training, 
first aid training, and force protection training (Spain). 
The third goal of the US-Nigerian Commission was the promotion of energy 
reform and stabilization of oil production in the Delta. One of the Commission’s working 
groups was dedicated to energy and investment. Secretary Clinton announced in August 
2010 that the US was providing $1.5 million in technical support to help improve 
Nigeria’s energy needs for its petroleum sector (“Remarks with Nigerian”). The goal of 
stabilizing oil production also involved improving the standard of living for Delta 
residents. In September 2010, the American non-governmental organization Council of 
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Foreign Relations hosted meetings for the Binational Commission’s working group on 
energy which were focused on addressing economic and infrastructure development in 
the Delta as well as the Nigerian government’s role in maintaining security in the region 
(“U.S.-Nigeria Binational”). 
Despite improved relations and increased cooperation, the United States failed to 
use its influence to publicly criticize Nigeria for its human rights record. Human rights 
were not mentioned in bilateral meetings between the US and Nigeria, nor were they a 
focus of the Binational Commission. In April 2010, Secretary Clinton’s description of the 
Binational Commission at a press conference made no mention of human rights issues in 
Nigeria (“Signing Ceremony”). Later, when the Commission’s working group on Niger 
Delta and Security Cooperation met in Washington D.C. in September 2010, the agenda 
did not include talks on human rights in the Delta, but rather on issues that would directly 
affect oil production and supply to the United States but that would not explicitly call out 
the Nigerian government for abuses against civilians in the Delta such as security, 
economic and infrastructure development, and state governance issues (“U.S.-Nigeria 
Binational”). US criticism of Nigeria remained rhetorical and calls for improvements in 
human rights were not reinforced with sanctions or revocations of aid. For example, US 
Department of State’s 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Nigeria noted 
several human rights violations by the Nigerian government, including extrajudicial 
killings by security forces (notably in the Delta region), torture, inhumane treatment of 
prisoners, denial of fair trials, violence and discrimination against women and children, 
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly, and human trafficking 
(“2010 Human Rights Report”). While the report indicates the United States’ criticism of 
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Nigeria’s human rights record, it lacked the pressure of a diplomatic public condemnation 
and disapproval of the Nigerian government’s efforts to promote human rights. It is likely 
that the United States avoided such harsh criticisms as it viewed continued political and 
economic stability in Nigeria in its best interests. Because past Nigerian political 
instability had resulted in military coups and because the United States relied on Nigeria 
for approximately 10 percent of its oil imports, the US arguably benefited from 
maintaining the status quo in Nigeria. Despite its shortcomings, a democratic Nigerian 
government would be preferable over a military dictatorship to the United States. 
Additionally, should Yar’Adua’s or Jonathan’s administrations have fallen, this could 
have cause upheaval in Nigeria’s oil industry as civil unrest may resulted in increased 
violence in the Delta and as new energy policies may have impacted oil production. 
Chinese Foreign Policy Toward Nigeria During Yar’Adua’s and Jonathan’s 
Presidencies 
Between 2007 and 2010, China became more active in Nigeria’s oil industry 
while its investment in Nigeria’s oil industry continued to grow. In December 2009, 
China purposed a $50 billion bid to purchase 6 billion barrels of Nigeria’s oil reserves 
(Sharma). However, China looked to secure oil not only through purchasing reserves, but 
by investing in Nigeria’s oil production as well. In May 2010 China signed a deal with 
Nigeria worth $23 billion to build three new oil refineries and a petrochemical plant in 
Lagos (“China Signs”). The three new refineries could process 900,000 bbl/day, or more 
than twice Nigeria’s capacity at the time (Hong’e). The increased capacity would further 
allow China to secure oil imports from Nigeria. The full potential of the new refineries 
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had not been realized by the end of 2010 at which point China was importing less than 
three percent of Nigeria’s total oil exports (“Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria”).  
China and Nigeria further developed bilateral relationships in other areas as well, 
notably trade, infrastructure, and technology. The value of total trade, measured in USD, 
between Nigeria and China increased almost 300% between 2004 and 2007 (“Chinese 
Ambassador”). In February 2008, Yar’Adua travelled to China and met with President 
Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. After discussions, both countries pledged to increase 
economic cooperation. Notably, President Hu stated that China was pleased by Nigeria’s 
“One China” policy (Liang, Yan). Nigeria and China fulfilled their pledges to increased 
trade and economic cooperation. Trade between Nigerian and China was valued at $7.8 
billion in 2008 while Chinese investment in Nigeria was valued at $7.5 billion in June 
2008 (“Chinese Ambassador”). Chinese investments focused heavily on Nigeria’s 
infrastructure. In July 2008 the China Harbour Engineering Company signed a $1 billion 
deal to construct a six-lane road around Port Harcourt in the Delta region. Additionally, 
the State Grid Corporation of China was reportedly working to upgrade the Delta 
region’s electricity system (Tattersall, “Chinese Firm”). The upgrades are likely linked to 
Chinese interests in the region as the larger highway would improve transportation of oil 
products for export and the improved electricity system would increase production 
capacity of oil refineries and production facilities. However, cooperation was not 
restricted to the oil sector. According to The China Daily, China was involved in 56 
projects throughout Nigeria in 2010, most of which focused on road and electricity 
infrastructure and included locations outside the Delta such as Abuja and in Niger state 
(Chao). In December 2010, China and Nigeria signed another deal, this time valued at 
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approximately $900 million, for the construction of rail and communication projects 
badly needed for Nigeria’s economic development (Hong’e). In addition to infrastructure, 
China also worked with Nigeria to improve Nigeria’s telecommunications technology. 
Nigeria was the first country to contract the production and launch of a Chinese-built 
satellite when China launched a communications satellite for Nigeria to improve cell 
phone and internet service in May 2007 (“China Builds”). The success led to the public-
private Nigerian company, Nigcomsat, contracting China to build and launch two more 
satellites for future launches (Guodong).  
China also provided Nigeria with military sales and assistance. In June 2009, 
Nigerian Defense Minister Shettima Mustapha travelled to Beijing to meet with Chinese 
Defense Minister Liang Guanglie to discuss military cooperation between the two 
countries (Mingxin). The same year The Journal of Energy Security reported that China 
had provided Nigeria with light patrol boats for the Delta region, two squadrons of F-
811M jets, and munitions (Hayward). China’s no questions asked policy of non-
interference coupled with its willingness to sell arms and military equipment to the 
Nigerian government facilitated the Nigerian military’s attacks on Delta militants and 
prompted Chinese interests in securing a steady energy supply from the Delta.
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
From 1993 through 2010 Chinese economic involvement in Nigeria coincides 
with a period of improving civil liberties and political rights scores in the country. 
However, the above process tracing reveals that despite the correlation, a causal 
relationship does not exist. Chinese economic involvement had little to no impact on 
Nigeria's Freedom House scores. The correlation is a result of Nigeria's Freedom House 
scores starting out incredibly low and of Chinese oil imports from Nigeria being zero in 
1993. Nigeria’s Freedom House scores could only improve while Chinese imports could 
only increase as Nigeria's scores could not go lower than a seven and neither could 
Chinese imports go lower than a zero. The factors that actually caused Nigeria's scores to 
worsen or improve were domestic. Nigeria's political rights score fell to a seven due to 
the annulment of the 1993 elections, the military coup, the removal of civilians from the 
government, and Abacha's control of political opposition (notably through intimidation 
and assassination by the State Security Service and the Presidential Strike Force). 
Likewise, Nigeria's civil liberties score was mostly impacted by Abacha's rule. The score 
started as a five in 1993, but fell to a six in 1994 and to a seven in 1995. The main causes 
were suppressions of free speech, press, and assembly along with massive human rights 
violations. Abacha's regime shut down newspapers and arrested journalists. When labor 
unions went on strike Abacha's security forces arrested union members. Additionally, 
security forces often treated union members violently, at times even killing union
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 members for protesting. Moreover, Abacha dissolved the labor unions and refused to 
reinstate their leaders when ordered to do so by Nigerian courts. Under Abacha's regime 
Nigerian law continued to not recognize marital rape as a crime and child labor remained 
common, hindering both women's and children's rights respectively. Police and military 
violence was common, especially in the Delta region. Oil companies played a role in this 
violence throughout the period and continue to do so. Abacha often responded with 
violence to protests at the request of oil companies such as Shell that noted security 
concerns impacting production. Additionally, oil companies failed to use their economic 
leverage to help political prisoners, such as Ken Saro-Wiwa. 
During Abacha’s rule China had very little impact on Nigeria's Freedom House 
scores or influence on political rights and civil liberties in the country. At the time China 
imported no oil from Nigeria, save for 1995, and was not active in Nigeria's oil industry. 
However, China did follow its policy of non-interference in other states' domestic affairs. 
When a General Assembly resolution condemning the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa came 
to a vote at the UN, China voted no. China would likely have opposed any international 
efforts to sanction Nigeria for its political and human rights abuses. China's non-
interference policy would have had the most impact at the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) where China, a permanent member, could have prevented a resolution 
from being passed with its veto alone. However, China was not alone in its opposition to 
sanctions; the United Kingdom and France, also permanent UNSC members, opposed 
sanctions due to economic ties with Nigeria as well. The severity of any possible effect 
China's opposition to sanctions may have had on Nigeria's Freedom House scores would 
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have been mitigated by the UK and France's opposition, both capable of preventing a 
resolution’s passage with a veto. 
Unlike China, the United States was a major actor in Nigeria's oil industry during 
Abacha’s rule. The US had the most economic and diplomatic influence on Nigeria as the 
US was the largest importer of Nigerian oil, US oil companies were heavily invested in 
Nigeria's oil industry from 1993 through 1998, and the US provided Nigeria with military 
and foreign aid. Although the US suspended all military aid, eliminated foreign aid 
(except that which was channeled through non-governmental organizations), revoked 
Nigerian visas, withdrew its ambassador, and expelled Nigerian officials from the US, 
called for economic sanctions in response to Abacha’s dictatorship and human rights 
abuses, the US failed to seriously consider, much less employ, its most influential tool, an 
oil embargo. With the US importing nearly half of Nigeria's oil exports, which accounted 
for 80 - 90% of the Nigerian government's revenue, the US had strong financial influence 
over Abacha's regime. While the United States did not have a direct impact on any of the 
factors that worsened Nigeria's Freedom House scores, the US's and Britain’s failure to 
exert its financial leverage over Abacha through an oil embargo make it the foreign actor 
most influential toward Nigeria's behavior. 
When Nigeria's political rights scores improved in 1998 and 1999, it was a direct 
result of the transition to and implementation of a civilian government. Abubakar’s 
handover to civilian government was the greatest reason Nigeria’s political rights score 
improved in 1999. The transition allowed for the formation of political parties, etc. As the 
head of the caretaker government established upon Abacha’s sudden demise, Abubakar 
allowed the creation and registration of new political parties and initiated steps toward a 
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national election, resulting in the election of Obasanjo as president. Political freedoms 
remained fairly robust throughout Obasanjo’s presidency (1999 – 2007). However, 
Nigeria’s political rights score could not improve above a four due to fraudulent elections 
in 1999 and rampant corruption which improved minimally and remained problematic 
throughout Obasanjo’s term as president. Although the Nigerian legislature managed to 
pass anti-corruption legislation, the bill’s weak language and enforcement failed to help 
Nigeria’s political rights score to improve. Nigeria’s civil liberties score rose from 1998 – 
2007 as well. This improvement was also a direct result of Abubakar’s transition program 
and the Obasanjo administration’s policy changes. Abubakar eased restrictions and 
prosecutions against the press. During Obasanjo’s presidency freedom of speech, press, 
and assembly were generally upheld. Like its political rights score, Nigeria’s civil 
liberties score did not improve above a four either. The causes for the score’s stagnation 
were domestic. Fewer restrictions on freedom of religion allowed for the creation and 
implementation of Shari’a law in northern Nigeria. However, this change in itself was 
perceived by non-Muslim as a threat to freedom of religion as Shari’a law was perceived 
as negatively impacting women’s rights, as women were treated differently than men 
under Shari’a and often received harsher legal punishments in Shari’a courts, notably in 
adultery and extra-marital sex related cases. Additionally, eruptions of violence between 
Muslims and Christians, many times over the implementation of Shari’a law, and violent 
police and military responses prevented Nigeria’s civil liberties score from improving. 
Political assassinations and violence were also common. Finally, human trafficking 
remained a significant problem in Nigeria throughout the period under review. 
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Much of the violence in Nigeria was related to the poverty and inequality which 
resulted from the disparate distribution of wealth associated with Nigeria’s oil industry. 
In the Delta region, violence broke out when local, armed rebel groups attacked oil 
infrastructures and kidnapped oil workers, acts which were often met with violence by 
Nigerian security forces. Despite the violence, multinational oil companies, including 
Chinese national oil companies, continued to invest in Nigeria’s oil industry. Between 
1998 and 2007, Chinese oil imports and overall imports from Nigeria increased, resulting 
in a correlation between Chinese economic involvement and Nigeria's Freedom House 
scores. However, China had little impact on Nigeria's scores. Despite increased oil 
imports from Nigeria, China remained a minor player in Nigeria's oil industry and in 
Nigerian trade. For several of the years during this time period, China imported less than 
1% of Nigeria’s total exports (see Appendix Table A1). China became more 
economically involved through diplomatic relations as it increased foreign aid to Nigeria, 
specifically regarding infrastructure projects, during this time. If China had any impact on 
Nigeria's Freedom House scores it would have been a negative one, as China failed to use 
its small, but growing, economic and diplomatic influence to pressure the Nigerian 
government to institute good governance and address corruption reform.  
China was not alone in this position. Once Nigeria returned to a civilian 
government the United States quickly restored foreign aid, military aid, and diplomatic 
relations despite ongoing political and civil rights abuses. Additionally, the United States 
continued to be the largest importer of Nigerian oil. Because of their investment in 
Nigeria’s oil industry, the United States and Great Britain, more than any other foreign 
countries, were in a position to influence Nigerian political and civil rights. While the US 
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urged Nigeria to promote good governance and transparency and worked with Nigeria in 
anti-terrorism efforts, the US remained publicly silent regarding Nigeria’s human rights 
abuses. The United States’ silence on this issue resulted in a lack of meaningful pressure 
on the Nigerian government to address human rights concerns. In this regards, US foreign 
policy in Nigeria was nearly identical to Chinese foreign policy. 
Nigeria’s political rights score dropped to a five in 2008 and 2009. The presence 
of previously existing factors, namely corruption, caused the score to remain a four in 
2007. The decrease in 2008 and 2009 was a direct result of widespread electoral fraud in 
the 2007 elections and the consolidation of power by the PDP as a result of the fraudulent 
election outcomes. The score remained a five until 2010 when Nigerian courts overturned 
several of the PDP’s most questionable election victories, slightly decreasing its 
consolidation of political power. However, corruption remained an issue through 
Yar’Adua’s and Jonathan’s presidencies, despite reform attempts. Nigeria’s civil liberties 
score did not change at all from 2007 – 2010. Many of the same factors as before 
prevented the score from improving. While freedom of speech, press, and religion were 
generally respected the press continued to be attacked for printing or airing negative 
reports on the government or politicians. Moreover Shari’a law remained in place in 
several Nigerian states continuing to negatively impact women’s rights and harshly 
punishing homosexual behavior. Women and children also continued to be at risk for 
human trafficking or child labor and the practice of FGM continued. Lastly, violence 
between religious groups was common, as was police and military brutality.  
Violence was also prevalent in Nigeria’s oil industry in the Delta. Rebel groups 
and gangs continued to fight for greater shares of oil revenue and civil society pushed for 
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better environmental protection. Police responses to rebel attacks were often times 
violent. Despite the violence and subsequent instability in the Delta, China continued to 
import Nigerian oil and invest in Nigeria’s oil industry. China agreed to build three new 
oil refineries and a petrochemical plant in Nigeria to improve the country’s production 
and refining capacity. Along with this investment, China invested in Nigeria’s 
infrastructure and provided Nigeria with technology assistance. Although Chinese 
economic involvement in Nigeria increased and is seemingly correlated with worsening 
political rights scores in 2008 and 2009, China had little impact on Nigeria’s Freedom 
House scores. China still imported only a tiny fraction of Nigeria’s oil. China’s greatest 
impact would be in selling Nigeria’s government military equipment such as boats and 
arms which could be used to suppress rebel groups in the Delta. However, as in previous 
years, US had a larger economic involvement in Nigeria than China. The United States 
continued to offer foreign aid and assistance to Nigeria, including military aid and 
training. It also remained the largest importer of Nigerian oil. The United States 
continued focused its diplomatic efforts in Nigeria encouraging improvements on 
corruption, political reform, and security in the Delta region. The US failed to publicly 
pressure Nigeria to address human rights abuses, despite State Department reports 
detailing human rights violations in Nigeria. The US policy in Nigeria continued to 
resemble China’s non-interventionist policy in practice.  
This study reminds us of the misleading nature of using statistical analysis as a 
sole means of determining casual relationships between variables. While increasing 
Chinese economic involvement is correlated to improved Freedom House scores in 
Nigeria, there is no causal relationship. Chinese economic involvement did not promote 
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political and civil liberties in Nigeria, nor did it directly hinder them. Both Chinese 
economic activity and Nigeria’s Freedom House scores could only increase and improve 
during the time period covered in this case study. The changes in Nigeria’s scores were 
direct results of domestic factors. The foreign actor with the most economic influence and 
thus the most probable influence on the Nigerian government was the United States. The 
US failed to employ oil sanctions against Nigeria or to publicly criticize the elected 
civilian regimes in order to pressure the Nigerian government to end human rights 
violations. China’s silence on human rights violations in Nigeria would have had no 
greater weight than the United States’. In light of this and the influence of domestic 
factors, this thesis finds that not only was the hypothesis wrong, but that Chinese 
economic involvement had no direct causal effects on Nigeria’s Freedom House scores. 
Moreover, in this case study, since Chinese and American policies were very similar in 
practice, it is unlikely that would have a direct effect on Nigeria’s Freedom House scores 
even if had China been the major or only importer of Nigerian oil. In the future, should 
Nigeria return to military rule, the US’s policy would probably remain the same. While 
the United States may strongly criticize a military coup and possibly suspend foreign aid, 
it is unlikely the US would threaten Nigeria with an oil embargo to force a return to 
democracy. 
 So far the US and China have not come to a clash over oil and energy policies in 
Nigeria. Canada and Mexico remain two of the United States main suppliers of oil. 
Chinese NOCs only have a minimal presence in either country. For the time being, it is 
unlikely China or Chinese NOCs will obtain or exercise the same level of influence and 
involvement as the United States and Great Britain in Nigeria and Nigeria’s oil industry. 
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However, when projected into the future, the scenario may change. China currently uses 
less than half the amount of oil the United States uses, but has a population four times 
greater than the United States. At the same time global population growth and 
development will result in an ever increasing demand for oil. Both the United States and 
China have oil policies are similar as they are driven by domestic factors, notably 
domestic demand. If the Chinese government is to maintain its legitimacy it must be able 
to sustain the current level and pace of development and growth in China. To do so will 
require increasing amounts of oil imports. Some calculations project China will overtake 
the United States as the world’s largest consumer of oil by 2030. If so, it’s extremely 
possible that China and the US will compete for many of the same oil supplies. It’s 
important to caveat this forecast by noting that past predictions of imminent oil shortages 
have not come to fruition as new sources of oil are continuously being discovered. 
However, oil is a finite natural resource, and even with new discoveries, it remains a 
possibility that world oil supplies may not be able to meet the needs of consumers in the 
future if consumption rates increase. In this event, Chinese involvement in the oil 
industry may have a more significant impact on US policy objects than it does presently. 
Additionally, most the oil overseas Chinese NOC’s secure via oil equity agreements ends 
up in the global market. However, in the future, should China need its oil equity for 
consumption, available global supplies of oil could diminish, creating greater competition 
between China and the United States for oil supplies and greater friction between their 
opposing energy policies. 
While this study concluded that China’s economic involvement had no causal 
relationship with Nigeria’s Freedom House score, this finding cannot be extrapolated to 
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other cases due to its reliance on factors unique to Nigeria. This study recommends that 
future research be done to determine the impact of China’s economic involvement on 
other states’ Freedom House scores. Since China’s involvement in Nigeria’s oil industry 
was minimal compared to the United States, future research should focus on countries 
with which China has a higher level of economic involvement. With this in mind, this 
study recommends that Sudan and South Sudan be examined in future research. Not only 
does China have a high level of economic involvement in Sudan’s oil industry, but also 
has close political ties with Khartoum. Such a case study would provide more qualitative 
data and allow for a more in depth analysis of the effects of Chinese petroleum 
diplomacy on a state’s Freedom House scores. Moreover, because China was active in 
the Sudanese oil industry when South Sudan inherited the majority of Sudan’s oil fields 
upon becoming an independent country, the case would provide insight into China’s non-
intervention policy. Notably, a problem arises for China’s non-interventionist policy 
because, while South Sudan possesses most of the oil fields, the pipeline to export the oil 
runs through Sudan. Future research should examine whether or not China can remain a 
non-aligned party in its relations between South Sudan and Sudan. 
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VIII 
APPENDIX TABLES 
A1: Nigerian Oil and Total Export Data 
Year 
Total Oil 
Exports To 
China In USD 
Total Overall 
Oil Exports 
To World In 
USD 
Total Overall 
Exports To 
China In USD 
Total 
Overall 
Exports To 
World In 
USD 
Percentage 
Of Total 
Exports To 
China 
1993 0 n/a 529,845 n/a n/a 
1994 0 n/a 1,064,257 n/a n/a 
1995 56,633,927 n/a 59,711,253 n/a n/a 
1996 0 n/a 6,820,653 11,393,896,390 0.06 
1997 0 n/a 10,632,028 11,163,923,370 0.10 
1998 17,633,820 n/a 27,423,348 6,868,921,344 0.40 
1999 155,541,697 n/a 182,483,832 16,123,503,616 1.13 
2000 268,861,807 n/a 307,296,342 27,079,246,652 0.83 
2001 161,478,273 n/a 227,157,472 18,046,078,734 1.26 
2002 86,853,370 n/a 121,308,269 18,607,065,931 0.65 
2003 27,228,036 n/a 71,658,792 24,078,329,294 0.30 
2004 411,931,140 n/a 463,216,342 n/a n/a 
2005 503,894,560 n/a 526,879,258 n/a n/a 
2006 223,520,128 n/a 277,747,279 59,215,233,334 0.47 
2007 461,509,241 n/a 537,080,321 53,963,110,729 1.00 
2008 273,680,473 n/a 508,380,981 81,820,518,366 0.62 
2009 713,999,581 42,212,038,172 896,525,833 49,937,459,606 1.80 
2010 564,820,446 60,904,645,725 1,440,809,162 86,567,912,529 1.66 
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A2: Dependent Variable Data for Nigeria 
Year 
Freedom House 
Political Rights 
Rating 
Freedom House 
Civil Liberties 
Rating 
1993 7 5 
1994 7 6 
1995 7 7 
1996 7 6 
1997 7 6 
1998 6 4 
1999 4 3 
2000 4 4 
2001 4 5 
2002 4 5 
2003 4 4 
2004 4 4 
2005 4 4 
2006 4 4 
2007 4 4 
2008 5 4 
2009 5 4 
2010 4 4 
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